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ABSTRACT
The ability for crewmembers to perform spacewalks is an essential component of
human spaceflight. Spacewalks are absolutely crucial for planetary exploration because
they enable astronauts to explore their environment, conduct scientific experiments on the
planetary surface, construct space-based infrastructure, and perform maintenance
activities. The spacesuit is the primary piece of enabling hardware for spacewalks. Given
that the United States is embarking on an ambitious mission to return to the Moon and
eventually travel to Mars (as mandated by the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration), a new
spacesuit will be built. The objective of this thesis is to aid the designers of the next-
generation spacesuit through critical analysis of existing spacesuits and quantitative
optimization of future spacesuit architectures.
Spacesuits change substantially over their design lifetimes; for example, the American
spacesuit, the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) has undergone over five hundred
changes in its twenty-five year operational life. These design changes have been triggered
by requirement changes, which in turn were mandated by political and technological
changes in the system’s environment. This observation points to the fact that the next-
generation spacesuit must be designed with the ability to cope with the likelihood of
changing requirements after it has been fielded. This goal, as I show in this thesis, can be
accomplished in two steps: first, the system designer must have an understanding of what
requirement changes are likely to occur; second, quantitative analysis can be used to
determine how requirement changes affect the design and subsequently what designs can
more readily accommodate change.
This thesis is divided into two parts that map into the two steps. Part I is comprised of
a comparative analysis of the EMU and Russian Orlan spacesuits. In order to understand
how the spacesuits have changed, I propose a change framework that links changes in a
system’s environment to changes in its requirements, which in turn necessitate design
changes. In Part I, I trace a single environment change, the use of the Shuttle EMU
aboard the International Space Station (ISS), to ten requirements changes that resulted in
a multitude of EMU design changes. This section finds that the divergence of the
4American and Soviet spaceflight programs in the late 1970s, with the Americans
concentrating on the Shuttle and the Soviets on station-based flight, is essential to
understanding differences in American and Soviet/Russian spacesuit design. Because of
the Soviet/Russian space program’s experience with long-duration, station-based
spaceflight, the Orlan spacesuit was able to more readily adapt to the ISS environment.
Whereas Part I looks back at the evolution of spacesuit architectures, Part II looks ahead
toward the future of spacesuit design. The second part of the thesis discusses the
development of a multidisciplinary spacesuit model and uses an N-Branch Tournament
Genetic Algorithm to optimize the spacesuit design vector for mass, mobility, and pre-
breathe time. Because the model used for this optimization is multidisciplinary,
fundamental tensions in spacesuit design are captured that have not before been explored
with existing single-discipline models. Part II finds that the optimal spacesuit garment is
different in microgravity than on the planetary surface because the desired mobility is
different. Taken as a whole, this thesis offers a comprehensive evaluation of spacesuit
design and evolution, and should prove useful in the design of the next-generation
spacesuit.
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Nomenclature
ε = radiator emissivity
µ = mean value
σ = Stefan-Boltzmann constant
C = battery capacity
CpWater = specific heat of water
g = gravity
mbatt = battery mass
mPMAD = power management and distribution hardware mass
€ 
˙ m In  = mass flow rate at inlet
€ 
˙ m rad = mass flow rate through radiator
€ 
˙ m rad ,bypass= mass flow rate around radiator
€ 
˙ m sub = mass flow rate through sublimator
€ 
˙ m sub,bypass= mass flow rate around sublimator
n = transmission efficiency
Pbattery = power generated by battery
PCM = power generated by crewmember
Pdemand = power needed by suit
PSuitLeak = power lost to environment through suit
qrad = actual heat rejected by radiator
qrad,max = maximum heat rejected by radiator
qsub = actual heat rejected by sublimator
qtot = total heat inputted to spacesuit
ROMx = range of motion for arms, legs, or torso
SArad = radiator surface area
Tamb = ambient temperature
Trad,Out = temperature at the radiator outlet
Tsub,In = temperature at the sublimator inlet
Tsub,Out = temperature at the sublimator outlet
TWater,Out = temperature at the thermal subsystem exit
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TWater,In = temperature at the thermal subsystem entrance
Torquex = joint torque of arms, legs, or torso
Vbatt = battery volume
wx t = weighting factor for the arms or legs
CCC = Contamination Control Cartridge
DCM = Display and Control Module
DCS = Decompression Sickness
EMU = Extravehicular Mobility Unit
EVA = Extravehicular Activity
GA = Genetic Algorithm
GCR = Galactic Cosmic Radiation
HUT = Hard Upper Torso
HX = Heat Exchanger
IVA = Intravehicular Activity
ISS = International Space Station
LCG = Liquid Cooling Garment
LCVG = Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment
LiOH = Lithium Hydroxide
Metox = Metal Oxide
MR = Metabolic Rate
PBT = Pre-Breathe Time
PLSS = Portable Life Support System
SAA = South Atlantic Anomaly
SAFER = Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue
SOP = Secondary Oxygen Pack
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When working outside the environment, i.e., outside the
habitation in the ether, nakedness would be inadvisable. In
the ether, in the void, workers would put on special
protective clothing resembling a diving suit. Such suits, like
the enclosed habitations, would provide oxygen and absorb
human exhalation. They would constitute a form of
miniature habitation, tightly fitting the inhabitant’s body.
K.E. Tsiolkovsky, Exploration of the Universe with
Reaction Machines, 1926
1 Introduction
It is impossible to know when the need for spacesuits in outer space first became
apparent. Fictionalized accounts of space travel from 165 A.D. through the early
nineteenth century envisioned other-worldly adventures undertaken in unpressurized
sailing vessels, balloons, and even by bird.1 The first mention of spacesuits in fiction is
found in Jules Verne’s From the Earth to the Moon, where Verne describes spacesuits
similar to those developed during Project Apollo.2 K.E. Tsiolkovsky, the father of
cosmonautics, first wrote of spacesuits as an engineering possibility in his 1926 work
Exploration of the Universe with Reaction Machines. In this prescient work, Tsiolkovsky
describes the basic functions of modern spacesuits: pressure production, oxygen delivery,
contaminant removal, thermal control, mobility, and protection from the sun’s rays.3
Working independently, German visionary Hermann Oberth described the basic design of
a spacesuit in 1929 (Figure 1):4
I would make them of thin polished tin and, in principle, similar to the deep-sea
divers’ equipment already in use today. For hands, I would attach claws. The feet
could have hooks with which the diver can hold on to the cables or rings
especially attached for this purpose to the projections of the rocket. . . . I would
embed the joints in a balloon of canvas lined with a thin layer of rubber on the
inside The whole diver’s equipment could be tested before the ascent by sticking
it into a somewhat large deep-sea diver’s suit and using the air hose of the deep-
sea equipment to evacuate the space between the two suits.
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Figure 1. First Known Spacesuit Sketch
Since the early conceptions of spacesuits in the 1920s, spacesuits have become an
integral part of humankind’s exploration of space. Spacewalks, or Extravehicular
Activities (EVAs), have been a reality since Alexi Leonov’s 12 minute EVA from the
Voskhod spacecraft in March of 1965.5 During the past forty years, spacesuits have
enabled astronauts to walk on the Moon, service satellites, and assemble the International
Space Station (ISS). The current goals of the U.S. space program, announced in January
of 2004, call for a return to the Moon and eventual human exploration of Mars.6 In this
next era of planetary exploration, spacesuits will play an even more important role,
enabling astronauts to interact with their surroundings and helping them to accomplish
the scientific and engineering goals of the mission. For this reason, the development of
EVA systems was defined as a key enabling technology in the Report of the President’s
Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy.7 The main
purpose of this thesis is to aid the designers of the next-generation spacesuit through
rigorous analysis of existing spacesuits and quantitative optimization of future spacesuit
architectures.
1.1 Thesis Objectives and Contributions
As the U.S. prepares to design its first new spacesuit in three decades, it is important to
understand the spacesuit in the context of EVA systems, learn from previous American
and Russian spacesuit designs, and bring to bear quantitative modeling and optimization
methods. As stated above, the main purpose of this thesis is to aid in the design of the
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next-generation spacesuit by recognizing lessons learned in past spacesuit design and
identifying best practices for future designs. The approach this thesis takes toward
spacesuit design is multifaceted; policy considerations are deliberated alongside technical
requirements, past challenges with present realities, single-mission optimums with multi-
mission designs.
The first contribution of this thesis is its broad, integrated perspective. This work
builds on the existing spacesuit literature by reflecting upon the spacesuit as one part of a
complex, system-of-systems and advocates that the design of the next-generation
spacesuit be in full cooperation with the other systems that enable EVA. Additionally, the
thesis provides detailed case studies of the change histories of both the American Extra-
Vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit and the Russian Orlan spacesuit. The
comparative analysis of these two suits is a second contribution to the existing spacesuit
literature. A firm understanding of how each system came to be along with the
knowledge of how and why each system changed is essential to designing future
spacesuits capable of adapting to change.
The final contribution of this thesis is the use of multidisciplinary optimization
techniques in spacesuit design. Because the model used for this optimization is
multidisciplinary, fundamental tensions in spacesuit design are captured that have not
before been explored with existing single-discipline models. Optimal design vectors for
multiple operational environments are discussed. Taken as a whole, this thesis offers a
comprehensive evaluation of spacesuit design and evolution, from both a qualitative and
analytic perspective. The specifics of each chapter are outlined below.
1.2 Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is qualitative in nature and presents
a snapshot of spacesuits in time (synchronic view) as well as their evolution in time
(diachronic view). Part I consists of Chapter 2, An Integrated Systems Approach to
Spacesuit Design, Chapter 3, Understanding Change and Requirements Evolution in the
Design of the EMU, and Chapter 4, Comparative Analysis of the U.S. EMU and Russian
Orlan Spacesuits.
The objective of Chapter 2 is to understand the spacesuit in the context of EVA and
study what the technical community has written about spacesuit design. The traditional
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approach to EVA has customarily focused on, and sought to optimize, individual pieces
of hardware in isolation of the rest of the system. By having a component focus, the
traditional approach has often introduced inefficiencies into the system, generated
logistics and supply management problems, and created hardware legacies that are hard
to change and upgrade. In its stead, Chapter 2 presents an integrated systems approach for
EVA system design that seeks to optimize the overall system, rather than the individual
pieces of hardware.
Chapter 3 is a diachronic view of the American EMU spacesuit. It explores one
fundamental environmental change, using the Space Shuttle EMU aboard the ISS, and the
resulting EMU requirement and design changes. The EMU, like other complex systems,
faces considerable uncertainty during its service life. Changes in the technical, political,
or economic environment cause changes in requirements, which in turn necessitate design
modifications or upgrades. Chapter 3 makes the case that flexibility is a key attribute that
needs to be embedded in the design of long-lived, complex systems to enable them to
efficiently meet the inevitability of changing requirements after they have been fielded.
Chapter 4, the final chapter in Part I, discusses the design of the Russian Orlan
spacesuits and compares their current design to the design of the EMU. This chapter finds
that differences in the design of the EMU and Orlan are attributable to the varied foci of
the two programs. Because the Soviet/Russian program centered upon long-duration,
station-based spaceflight, the Orlan was designed to be maintainable on orbit, at the cost
of volume and crew time. On the other hand, the American Shuttle program of short,
highly intensive missions mandated that the suits require little on-orbit maintenance and
stowage volume as possible, leading to the design of a highly compact and complex
spacesuit. Chapter 4 provides a contrast of these two designs and illuminates dimensions
not seen by examining a single system.
Whereas Part I represents the qualitative core of the thesis, the analytic substance is
found in Part II. Chapter 5, Development of a Multidisciplinary Spacesuit Model, and
Chapter 6, Multi-Objective Spacesuit Design Optimization, bring to bear design
optimization techniques used for complex, multidisciplinary systems.
Chapter 5 describes the development of a multidisciplinary spacesuit model. Although
a partial understanding of the operation and performance of a spacesuit at the subsystem
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level can be attained using existing, single-discipline models, the spacesuit is a highly-
interdependent, human-sized spacecraft, and an integrated model is needed to aid in the
understanding, design, and operation of the spacesuit as a complex engineering system.
The model developed in this chapter includes thermal, power, mobility, and oxygen
subsystems and captures the interaction effects between these modules.
Chapter 6 uses the spacesuit model to explore the design space with respect to the
objective functions of mass, mobility, and pre-breathe time. First, a sensitivity analysis is
performed to gauge the effect of the design vector and parameters on the objective
functions. Secondly, a single point optimization is performed in a Mars environment
using an N-Branch Tournament Genetic algorithm. Finally, this optimization is repeated
in the microgravity environment and differences in the optimal design vector are
discussed.
Chapter 0 contains conclusions and recommendations for future work.
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2 An Integrated Systems Approach to Spacesuit Design
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: (1) to advocate for an integrated systems
approach to EVA systems design, and (2) to give an overview of what the technical
community has written about spacesuit design. Section 2.1 introduces the traditional
approach to EVA system design and presents an integrated systems approach that seeks
to optimize the overall system, rather than the individual pieces of hardware. Section 2.2
is a literature review of spacesuit design and outlines key work in the history of the
American and Soviet/Russian space programs.
2.1 Contrasting Traditional and Integrated Approaches to EVA
Systems Design
Even though EVA is an activity, it is often thought of in terms of its enabling
hardware. The most common public image of a spacewalk is the spacesuit, the current
U.S. version of which is called the EMU. The spacesuit is itself a complex engineering
system, providing a variety of functions including protection from radiation and particle
impacts, a breathable atmosphere, temperature control, and mobility. Table 1 shows a
detailed breakdown of the EMU’s functions, categorized by the two main parts of the
spacesuit, the life support system and the spacesuit garment. Although the spacesuit is the
primary piece of hardware used during an EVA, spacewalks would not be possible
without a litany of other hardware including an airlock, tools, restraint devices and
handholds, cameras, communication devices, and many other smaller pieces of hardware.
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Table 1. Principal Functions of the EMU
Primary Life Support System Spacesuit Garment
primary oxygen supply
suit pressure and ventilation
communications
breathing gas purification
temperature control
power
emergency oxygen supply
biomedical and suit data
atmosphere containment
high mobility joints
thermal isolation
cooling distribution
drinking water
waste collection
radiation protection
micrometeoroid debris protection
In the context of exploration-class EVA, this list grows to include rovers, dust mitigation
devices, and scientific equipment (Figure 2). The EVA system is in fact a complex,
system-of-systems.
The traditional approach to EVA systems can be characterized as spacesuit-centric.
Although the EVA system includes all of the hardware mentioned above, the capability to
perform an EVA is sometimes used as a synonym for the spacesuit itself. In other words,
the function of performing a spacewalk is treated as interchangeable with the primary
piece of hardware that enables it. The main drawback of the traditional approach is the
danger of making design decisions at the individual component or subsystem level
without the keeping entire system in mind and without anticipating change. This
approach can introduce inefficiencies into the system, generate logistics and supply
management problems, and create hardware legacies that are difficult to change and
upgrade.
The electrical subsystem of the EMU is a good example of the legacy problems
resulting from the lack of a systems approach to EVA, and illustrates some of the
disadvantages of the traditional (component-focused) approach. The EMU contains five
different types of batteries, one each to support the function of the EMU electrical
subsystem, helmet lights, camera, Simplified Aid For EVA Rescue (SAFER), and the
Pistol Grip Tool. The battery for each of these subsystems was designed and uniquely
optimized for that subsystem. The helmet light batteries, for example, were sized
according to the duration, illumination, and redundancy requirements of the lights only.
When the mandate for a new capability that required power arose, new, individually
optimized batteries were designed for it as well. Because each new battery is uniquely
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Rover
propulsion
power
communications
navigation
scientific instrumentation
Informatics
medical monitoring
wireless communication
electronic field notebook
systems monitoring
voice/video data
Tools
surface excavation
assembly
repair
mobility aids
navigation
scientific instruments
Airlock
suit don/doff
depress/repress
recharge suit consumables
decontamination
Suit
primary life support system
spacesuit garment
Other
software
procedures
training
personnel
Figure 2. Primary Components of the EVA System-of-Systems
designed, the EMU is replete with one-of-a-kind subsystems. Rather than reusing proven
designs, each new battery system introduces a set of hardware idiosyncrasies, increases
the chance of technology infant mortality, and adds to system mass, volume, and
complexity. Battery supply management difficulties intensify with the number of
batteries by increasing the number of spares that must be stored on the Shuttle or ISS.
Optimizing a system for a single, specific purpose creates a legacy that is often hard to
change and upgrade. In contrast to the traditional approach, the integrated systems
approach views the capability to perform an extravehicular activity as the goal, then aims
to design the overall system to achieve that capability.
From an integrated systems point of view, the ability for crewmembers to safely
perform useful work outside the primary spaceship is the end goal. Although the
distinction is subtle, the difference is that the integrated systems approach focuses on the
end goal (EVA), whereas the traditional approach focuses on the means to that end
(spacesuit design). This focus establishes the overall system architecture and guides all
decisions made within the system. The integrated systems approach improves system
interfaces because of the need to design hardware in concert. Designing with the overall
system in view allows engineers to take advantage of system redundancies, increasing
reliability and easing logistics problems. To extend the example of the EMU batteries, it
is the capability to provide power that designers should consider first, not the battery
itself. In addition, rather than focusing solely on the specific power requirements for a
certain subsystem, system-wide needs should be anticipated and assessed. Even though
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specific power needs are known upfront, engineers would be well-advised to design for a
broad range of power requirements, in anticipation of potential changes / increases in the
EMU’s power requirement in the future. This approach is already used in the design of
some portions of the EMU: for example, when NASA upgraded the EMU glove heaters
to a new 12V design, engineers designed the electrical harness with extra connectors for
12V devices, easing the implementation of future suit upgrades and adding flexibility to
the system.
Continuing to focus on the power subsystem, a second recommendation following
from the integrated systems approach is the standardization and adoption of a modular
design for the power supply. This recommendation could be implemented by a design
similar to the AAA/AA/C standard batteries in everyday use. A discrete number of
standardized batteries can be used not only in the EVA system, but also in any system
throughout the spacecraft requiring power. In this way, engineers could focus on
providing a few reliable products, battery chargers could be common, and fewer batteries
would have to be certified. For example, if a particular subsystem required two ‘AA’ type
batteries, the system could be designed with space for three or four batteries. Initially,
only two batteries would be used, but more could be added as the power needs increased.
Logistically, a small number of each battery type would be adequate to back up the entire
system, saving space and mass. Any improvement in battery technology would affect all
systems in the same manner, so only one upgrade method would have to be designed.
The benefits of commonality extend beyond hardware into procedures, human interfaces,
and ground support equipment.
The traditional approach to EVA has customarily focused on, and sought to optimize,
individual pieces of hardware in isolation of the rest of the system. By having a
component focus, the traditional approach has often introduced inefficiencies into the
system, generated logistics and supply management problems, and created hardware
legacies that are hard to change and upgrade. The systems approach advocated here can
aid the development of an exploration-class EVA system by optimizing the system as a
whole and designing for uncertainty. Because we have limited a priori knowledge of what
explorers might encounter on the surface of the Moon or Mars, it is necessary to design a
system capable of adapting to changes in requirements based upon what we discover and
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how the environmental uncertainty unfolds. Flexibility can be added to the system via
hardware design (e.g., modularity), software implementation, crewmember training, and
procedure development. Although it is not possible to anticipate each uncertainty, a
flexible system will meet changing requirements and be capable of incorporating
advances in technology with minimal performance and resource (e.g., mass, volume, and
cost) penalties.
2.2 Literature Review
The previous section highlighted the importance of spacesuit systems design. The
purpose of this section is to give the reader an overview of the literature in the field of
spacesuit design, which can be placed into two general groups. The first group focuses on
operational spacesuits, such as the EMU or the Soviet/Russian Orlan spacesuit, while the
second group documents research on future spacesuit designs and technologies. Although
most papers in the area of spacesuit design come from American, European, or
Soviet/Russian authors, a few spacesuit-related papers have been published from
engineers involved in China’s human space program.8-10
The existing literature on the EMU is thin and focuses on the early and middle history
of the spacesuit. A few publications describe Shuttle11,12 and ISS EVA requirements and
general spacesuit concepts.13-18 The references that concentrate on the EMU as a whole
do so primarily in the context of modifying the system for future programs.19-24 Other
papers document the development or analysis of particular EMU subsystems including
carbon dioxide removal,25,26 thermal protection,27 power,28 micrometeoroid
protection,29,30 radiation protection,31-34 and mobility.35 Balinskas and Tepper, spacesuit
engineers, describe in detail the early development of the EMU.36 The most current
information on the specifications of the EMU is the EMU Data Book, published by
Hamilton Sundstrand.37 A more general book, authored by Harris, outlines the history of
pressure suits and spacesuits and gives insight into their operation.38 Although access to
information on the Soviet/Russian space program was limited during the Cold War, the
literature published since 1990 is surprisingly rich and equal in detail, if not more
detailed, than the EMU literature.
Quite a few English language references have been published documenting the
maturation of the Soviet/Russian space program in general and spacesuits in particular.39
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These papers describe the history of Soviet/Russian spacesuit development, beginning
with the design of high altitude pressure suits as in the U.S.5,40,41 Russia’s current Orlan
spacesuit has been in operation since 1997 and has undergone four major revisions.
Several papers describe the evolution of the Orlan and the challenges of using a spacesuit
for long-term, station-based operations.42-46 In addition, a few papers have been written to
describe EVA medical challenges and compare the U.S. and Russian approaches to
astronaut safety.47-49 I.P. Abramov, a member of the original Zvzeda spacesuit
development team, wrote a book detailing the technical and political history of Russian
spacesuits and published many design details for the first time.50 For a detailed history of
EVA see “Walking to Olympus,” which includes a description of each individual US and
Soviet/Russian EVAs through 1997 including duration, tasks accomplished, and
milestones.51
While the literature mentioned thus far has focused on the design and development of
operational U.S. and Russian spacesuits, almost half of the overall spacesuit literature
focuses on the design of next-generation spacesuits. Scientists and engineers have been
anticipating interplanetary travel for decades and have been publishing design concepts
for planetary spacesuits since the mid-1960s.52 These papers range from descriptions of
general suit architectures53-58 to ideas for spacesuit garment design59-63 and life support
system design.64,65 The most developed designs are described in papers documenting
planned operational spacesuits, such as the joint European-Russian EVA Suit 2000.66-68
Quite a few papers discuss EVA requirements for planetary missions.69-78 Some
researchers work on the design of an advanced EVA subsystem such as
bioinstrumentation,79 thermal control,80-82 cooling garment,83 radiator,84 electronic cuff
checklist,85 and materials.86 The remaining papers discuss testing of EVA systems in
Mars analog sites such as the Arctic circle.87-89   
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3 Understanding Change and Requirements Evolution
in the Design of the EMU
Whereas Chapter 2 discussed an approach to designing the EVA system-of-systems,
this chapter focuses on the design evolution of a single spacesuit, the EMU. This chapter
explores one fundamental environmental change, the decision to use the Space Shuttle
EMU aboard the ISS, and the resulting EMU requirement and design changes. The EMU,
like most complex engineering systems, faces considerable uncertainty during its service
life. Changes in the technical, political, and economic environments may cause changes
in requirements, which in turn necessitate design changes.
Section 3.1, Introduction to Requirements Change, challenges the common
presumption that requirements change should be avoided and proposes a new attitude
toward change. Rather than artificially freezing requirements, system designers are
beginning to acknowledge that change is inevitable in the design of any long lifetime
system and design their systems to be able to adapt to this change. Section 3.2, History
and Background of the EMU, examines the history of the EMU, describes its major
components and functions, and discusses the baseline environment in which the spacesuit
was initially designed to operate. Fundamentally, the EMU was conceived as a limited-
capability spacesuit to be used in emergency situations. However, immediately after it
was fielded, NASA began to make changes to the EMU for a variety of reasons. Section
3.3, EMU Environment Change, explores the implications of the decision to modify the
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Shuttle EMU for use aboard the ISS, and the resulting requirements and design changes.
The conclusion summarizes important findings: first, given the number of requirement
and design changes that occurred in the EMU, the next generation spacesuit, which will
likely be fielded for a decade or two, will have to be designed with the ability to cope
with the inevitability of changing requirements after it has been fielded; second, more
generally, flexibility will become an increasingly critical property that needs to be
embedded in the design of complex engineering systems, and thus allow them to easily
cope with uncertainty and changes in their environment and requirements. This chapter is
a comprehensive review of the requirement and design changes of the EMU and aims to
benefit the designers of the next generation spacesuit. A thorough understanding of the
current spacesuit and the changes it has undergone could aid in achieving an even better
design for future spacesuits, emulating the EMU in its strengths and learning from its
weaknesses.
3.1 Introduction to Requirements Change
Traditional systems engineering wisdom, developed and supported by decades of
experience in designing and operating complex engineering systems, holds that
requirements should be frozen as early as possible during the system’s development
phase, one rationale being that requirement changes or instabilities have a negative
impact on both system life-cycle cost and development schedule. Furthermore, it is
believed that the later in the development phase a requirement change is requested, the
higher the cost penalty is to implement this change, as shown in Figure 3 (adapted from
Ref. 90).
In practice however, freezing requirements, whether during the development phases or
after fielding a complex engineering system, is unrealistic. The IEEE Standard 1233
recognizes this fact and states that:91
Although it is desirable to freeze a set of requirements permanently, it is rarely
possible. Requirements that are likely to evolve should be identified and
communicated to both the customers and the technical community. A core subset
of requirements may be frozen early. The impact of proposed new requirements
must be evaluated to ensure that the initial intent of the requirements baseline is
maintained.
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Figure 3. Rationale for an Early Freeze of System Requirements
In short, requirement changes in the traditional systems engineering approach are
undesirable, but are cautiously tolerated when they are inevitable.
The last two decades have witnessed a trend in increasing system design lifetime. For
example, communication satellites have seen their design lifetime increase from seven to
fifteen years over this time period.92 This trend – also observed in the design of other
aerospace and numerous defense systems – is the result on the one hand of budgetary
constraints and financial pressure to maximize the return from such high-value assets,
and on the other hand of increased reliability and technical advances that allow complex
engineering systems to remain operational for such long periods of time. Why is this
observation a complicating factor to the traditional attitude towards requirement changes?
Engineering systems often operate in complex and rapidly evolving environments. As
their design lifetime increases, it becomes increasingly probable that the initial
environment from which the original system requirements were derived changes during
the system’s operational life. This environment change, whether political, economic,
physical or technological, will in turn cause requirement changes as a result of new
customer or user needs, or new identified opportunities. However, the same budgetary
constraints mentioned previously often mandate that the fielded system be modified or
upgraded to satisfy the new requirements and provide enhanced capabilities, instead of
developing a new, clean-sheet design. In this context, it is unrealistic to attempt to freeze
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requirements as early as possible, and the traditional attitude of the systems engineering
community towards change needs to be revisited: requirement changes will occur,
especially in long-lived systems, and instead of resisting them or passively accepting
them, it is preferable that system engineers “design for change,” or embed flexibility in
the design of complex engineering systems. Design flexibility is the property of a system
that allows it to respond to changes in its initial objectives and requirements that occur
after the system has been fielded, in a timely and cost-effective way.93
Increasingly, system designers recognize that their systems operate in a dynamic
environment, and that the systems are likely to change. Managers are beginning to
experiment with how to value uncertainty.94 Several new tools have been developed, and
old tools modified, to attempt to predict how changes in one part of an operating system
will affect the whole.95-97 Rather than passively reacting to change, some system
architects are beginning to develop design methodologies that could make their systems
resilient to change.98,99 This chapter argues that requirements change is an inevitability in
the life of any complex system and that embedding flexibility in the design enables it to
react more efficiently to change.
3.2 History and Background of the EMU
The EMU, the U.S. spacesuit, is a miniature spacecraft in the sense that it provides all
of the functions necessary to sustain life in a human-sized, mobile form. This section
examines the history of the EMU, describes its major components and functions, and
discusses the environment in which the EMU has operated in the Space Shuttle era. This
constitutes the baseline environment of the spacesuit against which we contrast the usage
of the EMU aboard the ISS, as well as the requirement and design changes that ensued
from this environment change.
3.2.1 EMU History: a Hesitant Commitment to an Invaluable System
 EVA has been a reality for the U.S. since the Gemini Program in 1965. Clean-sheet
spacesuit designs were undertaken for the Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle programs whereas
modifications of existing designs were used for Skylab and ISS.24 Throughout the Apollo
and Skylab programs, NASA gained extensive experience with EVA and spacesuit
design. The capability for humans to work outside the spacecraft proved invaluable time
and again:  for example, Skylab astronauts performed twelve contingency EVAs to fix
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unanticipated problems, repeatedly saving the space station from abandonment.13
However, despite the advantages of EVA capability, early Shuttle designs did not include
the means to perform EVA. This function was added later, and then only to provide the
ability to perform limited contingency operations.38 Because of the delayed decision to
develop a Shuttle spacesuit, EMU development lagged behind the Shuttle by
approximately four years. The vast majority of the overall Shuttle program was
conducted without a development phase, a reality especially true for the EMU. Initial
hardware designs were tested to flight standards and certified in parallel with early
Shuttle flights. The merging of the final testing and operational phases resulted in
approximately 4,000 person-hours of EMU processing between flights, compared to less
than 1,000 today.21 As America’s ability to perform complex operations in space
increased, so too did the EVA time required to achieve those objectives. Table 2 shows
the total person-hours of EVA time logged by American astronauts for each major human
spaceflight program. The EMU has performed more than 75 percent, by duration, of all
American EVAs. That the EMU was initially designed as a limited capability suit to
satisfy minimal mobility and operational requirements is astounding in light of the fact
that it has been subsequently used to repair satellites, construct a massive space structure,
and maintain the ISS.
Table 2. Summary of EVA Duration by Program [as of 13 May 2006]
Program Total EVA Duration Suit Used
Gemini   12:40100 G-4C
Apollo 165:1751 A7L/A7LB
Skylab   82:5251 A7LB
Shuttle 993:3551,101-134 EMU
ISS 231:54134-144 EMU
3.2.2 Functionality and Configuration
In order to understand how changes propagated through the EMU design as a result of
environmental changes, it is important to first understand how the system operates. This
section provides an overview of the functionality of the EMU as well as a brief
description of its major components. The EMU performs a variety of functions, including
providing a breathable atmosphere, mobility, temperature control, and protection from
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radiation and particle impacts. The two main components of the EMU are the Primary
Life Support System (PLSS), the spacesuit backpack, and the pressure garment. A
detailed schematic of EMU components is shown in Figure 4 (adapted from Ref. 37).
Proceeding from the top to the bottom of the EMU, the helmet assembly is comprised
of a clear, polycarbonate bubble and visors to protect from sun and impact. The helmet
connects to the Hard Upper Torso (HUT), a fiberglass shell that is the main structural
support for other elements of the suit including the PLSS. The Display and Control
Module (DCM) is mounted to the front of the HUT and contains external fluids and
electrical connections, thermal, pressure, and communication controls, and a display of
suit parameters. The arm assembly is attached at both shoulders of the HUT and contains
two mobility bearings, one each at the shoulder and wrist. The lower torso assembly is
the bottom half of the EMU and consists of the waist, brief, leg, and boot assemblies. The
PLSS has primary oxygen tanks and an emergency secondary oxygen pack. The
Contaminant Control Cartridge (CCC) removes CO2, odors, particulates, and other
contaminants from the oxygen. The battery supplies power for most EMU functions and
the sublimator, fan/pump/separator, and water tank work together to remove excess heat
from the system. When the EMU is inside the Shuttle or ISS airlock, it connects to the
vehicle via an umbilical, which attaches to the front of the DCM.
Comfort and mobility within the EMU are provided for through several pieces of
hardware. Before donning the spacesuit, astronauts put on the Liquid Cooling and
Ventilation Garment (LCVG), a tight-fitting, elastic body suit with flexible tubing woven
into the fabric. Whenever the crewmember is wearing the EMU, cold water circulates
through the tubing, removing excess body heat. The cooling garment also contains larger
tubes, which transport oxygen back to the PLSS for scrubbing. As described above,
mobility is provided through bearings located at the shoulder, upper arm, wrist, and
waist. Finally, five different layers of material provide thermal, radiation, and puncture
protection. The innermost layer is the pressure garment bladder, which contains the suit
atmosphere. The pressure garment cover is outside of the bladder and works to keep the
bladder in place. The final three layers are collectively called the Thermal
Micrometeoroid Garment, which consists of a rip-resistant material, thermal layers, and
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Figure 4. Extravehicular Mobility Unit Components
an outermost layer that resists contamination, puncture, and reflects radiation. The
number of thermal layers varies widely and is the thickest in the HUT and PLSS and
thinnest in the fingers, where the need for mobility is critical.
3.2.3 Definition of Environment
One goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how environmental changes trigger
requirement changes, which in turn necessitate design changes. The meaning of
environment is not restricted to the narrow sense of physical environment, such the
temperature and pressure surrounding a system. Instead, it is expanded it to include
political, economic, and technological conditions as well (Figure 5). As an illustration,
the environment of the maple tree in a yard includes physical factors such as the soil
conditions, rain patterns, and sunlight, political factors such as a rule against the tree
shadowing the neighboring yard, and economic factors such as whether or not the owner
received a subsidy to plant the tree. Similarly with the EMU, changes in its baseline
design were caused by changes in its environment: physical, political, technological and
economic environments or conditions as will be discussed in detail shortly.
3.2.4 Baseline Environment: Space Shuttle Mode
As noted above, the EMU was originally conceived as a limited-capability spacesuit to be
used exclusively in emergency situations. This contingency-only environment quickly
gave way to routine use of the EMU for satellite servicing, an operational mode termed
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Figure 5. Different environments of an object or system
the Shuttle environment. This section outlines general reasons for EMU design changes
and explores one specific change that occurred as a result of shifting the EMU to the
Shuttle mode.
Immediately after the EMU was fielded, NASA began to make changes to it for one of
four reasons:
1. Hardware Failure – if a part did not function properly or was found to be out of
specification, it was flagged and changed.
2. Obsolescence – when a manufacturer ceased making a particular part.
3. Hardware Upgrade – when advances in technology lead to improvement in suit
capability.
4. Goal Change – a programmatic decision to use the EMU in a way in which it
was not originally intended.
Broadly speaking, the first three reasons for change occur because of an altering
physical or technological environment, whereas the fourth is a consequence of the
shifting political and economic environment. A number of the changes to the EMU are a
consequence of the first and second reasons simply because they are not optional; when a
part fails or a key material is no longer available, it must be fixed or replaced. The third
reason is infrequent because, although engineers have an infinite supply of ideas for
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upgrades to the EMU, there are rarely enough resources to implement them. Changes in a
program’s goals, the fourth reason for change, are often imposed from outside of the
technical community; with the EMU these changes often come from Congress or the
Executive Branch. One important goal change that came soon after the EMU was
designed followed from the decision to use the Shuttle to release and service satellites.
The primary purpose of the EMU for most of the 1980s was to assist in this process.
One design change that came as a result of the EMU transitioning from contingency-
only to satellite servicing is an increase in its operating pressure. The EMU was initially
designed for a 28.3 kPa (4.1 psia) operating pressure primarily because this pressure was
close to NASA’s operational experience with the Apollo suits, which operated at 26.9
kPa (3.9 psia). Operating at a low pressure is advantageous in that it increases mobility
by decreasing the effort for an astronaut to move inside the suit because the astronaut
does less work to compress the gas-filled suit. However, it also puts the astronaut at an
increased risk of Decompression Sickness (DCS) and extends the time an astronaut must
pre-breathe pure oxygen to avoid DCS. Humans living at the Earth’s surface breathe an
atmosphere comprised of about 79 percent nitrogen and 21 percent oxygen at 101.4 kPa
(14.7 psia). As we breathe the nitrogen in and out, it becomes saturated in our blood and
is at risk of coming out of solution at reduced pressures, similar to the effect of carbon
dioxide bubbles being released when a soda can is opened. Nitrogen gas bubbles in our
system can cause a host of medical problems including “the bends,” mental impairment,
and death. In order to avoid DCS, astronauts must either experience slow decompression
over a period of days or pre-breathe pure oxygen for a period of hours prior to EVA.
NASA realized in the early 1980s that the pre-breathe time necessary for a 28.3 kPa (4.1
psia) suit was unacceptably long and the Shuttle could not reduce its cabin pressure low
enough for the crew to experience slow decompression. Because EVAs were becoming
more commonplace, reducing the overhead of performing a spacewalk was a priority.
Physiological experts eventually concluded that if the suit pressure were raised to 29.6
kPa (4.3 psia), a combination of reducing the Shuttle pressure and pure oxygen pre-
breathe would be acceptable. This change required changes in the pressure regulator
bands, changes in the crack pressures of the relief valves, and a recertification of the
EMU.
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Substantial requirements changes were again levied upon the EMU first in anticipation
of using it to support Space Station Freedom and later as a result of the need to use the
EMU aboard the ISS. The basic capabilities of the EMU, however, to support life in
space and enable useful work, remained unaffected, and a number of EMU components
such as the cooling garment, helmet, external visors, DCM housing, and the
Communications Carrier Assembly headset have remained unaltered. The next section
describes the changes that occurred as a result of using the EMU for the construction and
operation of the ISS.
3.3 EMU Environment Change
This section examines how environmental changes for the EMU caused requirements
changes, which lead to EMU design changes. The section begins with the political
decision to use the Shuttle EMU aboard the ISS and explores the resulting requirements
and design changes. Next, the change in the physical environment surrounding the EMU
and changes in the technical environment are examined and the resulting requirements
and design iterations are traced. Table 3 summarizes these changes.
3.3.1 Scrub ‘89
In 1989, the spaceflight community experienced a major setback and was forced to
eliminate or considerably cutback many programs when funding was significantly
reduced; Congress that year proposed to cut NASA’s budget by more than $1 billion
(about 8%), including reducing space station funding by $395 million. Plans for an
international space station were substantially downsized and, more importantly, the plan
to build a new, advanced space suit to service the space station and serve as a test bed for
planetary exploration technologies was eliminated. This event became known in the
space community as “Scrub ’89” and was the watershed event that mandated a change in
the EMU’s goals from Shuttle spacesuit to space station suit. The decision NOT to build
a space station-specific spacesuit, and instead to modify the EMU marked a shift in the
modus operandi of that system. Because on-orbit time was limited during the Space
Shuttle era, the EMU was designed to operate virtually maintenance-free during the
mission. Now that the EMU was to serve aboard the ISS, two requirements changes
occurred that are further discussed in the following: more on-orbit time between
hardware processing, and extended EMU life.22
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Table 3. Summary of Shuttle EMU Changes for ISS
Environment Change - Use Shuttle EMU Aboard ISS
Requirement Change Design or Procedure Change
Make EMU sizable on-orbit Adjustable cam sizing in softgoods
Sizing rings in arms and legs
Hard Upper Torso replaceable on-orbit
Hard Upper Torso redesigned
Increased EMU life Recertification of EMU components
Change in static seal material
Noise muffler redesign
Flow filter redesign
Coolant water bladder material change
Environment Change - Physical Environment of ISS
Requirement Change Design or Procedure Change
Minimum metabolic rate lowered Cooling garment bypass designed
Heated gloves redesigned
Lower probability of penetration Track orbital debris
Define allowable penetrations
Different radiation exposure Carefully plan all EVAs
Risk of propellant exposure 1-hr bake-out procedure
Lengthen umbilical
Environment Change - Technical Environment Advances
Requirement Change Design or Procedure Change
Advance in suit joint technology Joint patterning and materials changed
Bearing design and materials changed
Need for delicate assembly tasks Glove design and materials changed
Increased EMU life Battery redesign
Carbon dioxide removal technology upgrade
Carbon dioxide sensor upgraded
Secondary system in case of Design SAFER rescue system
    crewmember separation
3.3.2 On-Orbit Sizing
In the Apollo era, spacesuits were manufactured for individual crewmembers. This
philosophy shifted slightly during the Shuttle era due to a rapid increase in the
membership of the astronaut corps and in the number of EVAs. The major components of
the suit – HUT, lower torso assembly, arm assembly, LCVG – came in discrete sizes that
were uniquely adjusted to fit an individual crewmember using cloth strips sewn into the
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suit by technicians on the ground. Each Shuttle mission flew three EMUs, two primary
and one backup, and the two EVA astronauts were often chosen to be of similar physical
size so that they could fit in the same backup suit. In the ISS era, EMUs are on-orbit for a
period of months and need to be reconfigurable to fit a range of body sizes. The change in
requirement from “one suit-one person” to “one suit-many people” caused several design
changes. Changes to the spacesuit garment included added sizing cams to the lower arms,
Waist Brief Assembly, knees, and legs and sizing rings at the thigh and leg. In order to
further aid on-orbit sizing and servicing, NASA also changed the design of the HUT and
DCM to make them replaceable on-orbit.23 In theory, a crewmember can disassemble the
EMU and remove the DCM or HUT to make repairs or change size, although this has not
been done to date.
Both logistics issues and safety concerns motivated the redesign of the HUT. The
original HUT design, known as the pivoted HUT, was available in five sizes from small
to extra large and had four different sizes of Body Seal Closure, the connection between
the upper and lower torso. The term “pivoted HUT” comes from the type of shoulder
joint in the unit, which was mobile, but only single-fault tolerant and the point of lowest
safety in the entire EMU. The new design, known as the planar HUT, has a smaller
number of sizes, but a lower risk of failure.
3.3.3 Increased Life
The other requirement changes that occurred as a result of the decision to use the
Shuttle EMU aboard the ISS were the following: 1) extension of EMU life, 2) increase in
the number of EVAs a particular EMU could perform, 3) increase in the shelf life of the
EMU, and 4) increase in the number of days between ground servicing. Given the
significantly extended stay of astronauts aboard the ISS compared to the duration of
flight of the Space Shuttle (several months for the ISS compared with a couple of weeks
for the Shuttle), the EMU was required, following the decision to use it aboard the ISS, to
be capable of performing twenty-five EVAs in 180 days instead of the original
requirement of three EVAs in ten days. In addition, the EMU was required to be capable
of undergoing 180 days in space without being serviced. Rather than undertake an
extensive redesign of the EMU in order to meet these new requirements, NASA
engineers decided to upgrade the shortest life items so that they would last at least 180
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days.38 For example, some of the changes included replacing seal materials, a redesign of
the PLSS vent loop noise muffler, changes in the flow filters, and a change in the coolant
water bladder material.
3.3.4 Physical Environment of ISS
The ISS operates in a different physical environment than the Space Shuttle. Changes
to the thermal profile, radiation environment, micrometeoroid hazard, and contaminant
exposure risks all drove physical and operational changes to the EMU.
The EMU is designed to accommodate four specified levels of metabolic loading:
minimum rate, maximum rate, average rate, and a short-duration spike value. Because of
anticipated rest periods during space station construction, the requirement for minimum
metabolic rate changed from 117 W (400 BTU/hr) to 103 W (350 BTU/hr).37,38,145 Space
Shuttle astronauts have two countermeasures to mitigate periods of low thermal loading
during EVA. First, mission planners can schedule rest periods while the astronauts are in
the sunlight. Second, astronauts can rest within the Shuttle payload bay, thereby
increasing the thermal loading on the EMU due to the high emissivity of the materials in
the payload bay and the increased thermal radiation from the Shuttle itself.36 Because
neither of these countermeasures is available to ISS crew, the design of the EMU was
modified to accommodate the requirement change.
Lowering the minimum metabolic rate requirement resulted in three design changes:
the development of a cooling garment bypass, the design of glove heaters, and the
addition of thermal mittens to the suite of EMU support equipment. The crewmember is
able to control the water flow rate through their cooling garment via a temperature
control valve, located on the front of the DCM. In the original EMU design, the lowest
setting of the temperature control valve still allowed a minimal amount of water flow
through the cooling garment. The cooling garment bypass modifies the function of the
temperature control valve such that when a crewmember is cold, they are able to block
flow completely from the cooling garment, while water continues to run to the PLSS and
to the DCM to cool the electronics. In this setting, the astronaut is warmed entirely
through body heat. This new setting is necessary to keep the crewmembers warm during
periods of rest on ISS EVAs.
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EMU glove design also changed to incorporate both active and passive thermal
control. The design and implementation of glove heaters was due in part to the
anticipated needs of space station EVAs, but primarily driven by cold temperatures
experienced during training prior to the first Hubble Space Telescope servicing and repair
mission, STS-61 in 1993. During a thermal vacuum test chamber run, astronaut Story
Musgrave developed a mild case of frostbite in the fingers of his right hand.146 In
response to this event, NASA developed the first generation glove heater, using 3V
resistance heaters incorporated into the glove thermal micrometeoroid garment on the
back of each fingernail.
Penetration and subsequent loss of pressure by micrometeoroids and orbital debris is a
longstanding vehicle and spacesuit concern. Although the baseline requirement of a
probability of no penetration of 0.995 over ten years has not changed, the amount of
orbital debris increased significantly between early Shuttle flights and ISS operation. By
1994, the chance of penetration for particles larger than 0.1 cm diameter was greater for
orbital debris than for micrometeoroids and the overall probability of no penetration
continues to decrease. Although no design changes were adopted to mitigate this
problem, two procedural and organizational changes occurred. First, NASA introduced
the concept of allowable penetrations, under the assumption that the EMU’s emergency
oxygen supply would be able to keep up with small leaks. Second, NASA tracks orbital
debris and plans EVAs accordingly.36
The ISS inclined orbit and mission duration changes the radiation environment
crewmembers experience. During a mission, astronauts are exposed to three principal
types of space radiation: Van Allen Belt radiation, Galactic Cosmic Radiation, and
radiation from solar proton events. Although the orbit of the ISS does have an effect on
the radiation levels experienced by the astronauts, the overriding factor in radiation
dosage is the lengthened duration of the crew outside the Earth’s protective atmosphere.
Analysis of the new environment concluded that, with proper monitoring and planning,
NASA could maintain its current standards on radiation exposure without additional
EVA-specific shielding.147
The ISS has small jets that provide it with altitude control. The propellants used by the
jets pose an exposure risk to EVA astronauts. Although the Shuttle has similar jets, they
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are located around the Space Shuttle Main Engines, in an area inaccessible to EVA
astronauts, whereas on the space station it is possible for EVA crewmembers to traverse
into hazardous zones around the jets. Because of this physical environment change,
engineers modified EMU supporting hardware. In the event an EVA crewmember
becomes contaminated with one of the propellants, they must wait outside the airlock for
about an hour, in a “bake out” period, to allow the propellant to evaporate. The umbilical
that attaches to the airlock and refills the EMU’s consumables was lengthened to allow
the astronaut to use ISS consumables during this period.
3.3.5 Technical Environment Advances
Advances in technology enable hardware upgrades not necessarily because the old part
ceased to perform its function, but because newer parts are available to perform the
function better. Because these kinds of changes are not mandatory, they are sometimes
rejected due to lack of resources. As a result, EMU engineers often get to upgrade
antiquated technology only when it happens to be in line with a funded program, such as
the ISS. This section examines hardware upgrades made to the EMU as a result of the
decision to use it aboard the ISS. These upgrades include increased mobility joints; an
upgraded glove design; upgrades to the EMU batteries, CCC, and a new carbon dioxide
(CO2) sensor; and the design of the SAFER.
Advances in materials and joint design increased the mobility of the EMU. Working
inside of a spacesuit is akin to working inside a balloon. Each time you move an arm or
leg, you must do work to compress the gas inside the balloon as it shrinks in volume
while bending. The amount of torque necessary to move increases as the pressure inside
the balloon rises. The EMU pressure garment has two mechanisms that facilitate
spacesuit movement. Joints are formed by special patterning of the spacesuit fabric to
minimize the change in volume. At the knee, for example, the patterning allows the fabric
to expand across the kneecap and collapse behind the knee, reducing the amount of gas
that must be compressed. Bearings allow isovolumetric rotation of joints, and are
manufactured by placing small spheres in a track around the circumference of a joint.
Bearing torque is directly related to the contact area between the spheres and the tracks.
Engineers decreased joint torque by improving in the way that joints are patterned and
using stronger materials. Using a spacer between each sphere decreased bearing torque,
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cutting in half the number of spheres in the tracks and the surface contact area between
the spheres and races.
There is a basic tradeoff in glove design between durability and tactility. For most of
the shuttle years, a lower tactility glove was sufficient to perform EVA tasks, and
desirable because of its increased life. However, transitioning from Shuttle operations to
delicate ISS assembly procedures caused a change in glove design. The EMU gloves are
currently on their sixth iteration and are distinguished by their series number. Series 1000
and 3000 were used throughout the 1980s and were custom manufactured for individual
crewmembers. The 3000 series gloves offered individual finger adjustment capability, but
patterning caused excessive hand fatigue over an 8-hour EVA. 4000 series gloves were
very robust, had a very long life, and were used until the mid-1990s. To achieve this
durability, engineers traded off tactility and feedback, causing higher hand fatigue.
Around 1995, NASA introduced the 6000 series glove, which incorporates a lower-
torque wrist bearing and increases tactility and feedback. Although this glove helps the
crewmember to grasp small objects, its life is shorter compared to the 4000 series.
The design changes for PLSS batteries, CCC, and CO2 sensor were motivated by the
increased design life of the EMU. By adding more plates into the cells of the silver-zinc
batteries, the wet life was increased from 170 to 425 days. The old style of the CCC used
charcoal and lithium hydroxide to remove trace contaminants and carbon dioxide. One
CCC could only be used for one EVA before needing ground servicing. The new design
of CCC uses metal-oxide to absorb CO2 and is regenerable on-orbit a minimum of 55
times. The EMU CO2 sensor was upgraded from an electrochemical sensor to an infrared
transducer for safety and maintenance reasons. The electrochemical sensor had a delayed
response time to the level of CO2 in the spacesuit atmosphere and also required
recalibration before each Shuttle flight. The infrared transducer has an almost immediate
response time and requires little maintenance.
Flight rules dictate that EVA crewmembers must be tethered to the host vehicle at all
times. In the event of a separation, the Space Shuttle is able to reposition itself and
rendezvous with the astronaut. The ISS is incapable of such a maneuver. In order to add a
second layer of safety in the event of crewmember separation, engineers designed the
SAFER system.16 SAFER is a cold-gas propulsion system that provides adequate
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propellant for a crewmember to maneuver back to the ISS via a hand controller. The
SAFER system fits below the PLSS and does not interfere with suit mobility.
This chapter examined the baseline environment in which the spacesuit was initially
designed to operate during the early Space Shuttle era, and then contrasted it with the ISS
environment. The chapter demonstrates how changes in the physical, technical, and
political environment of the spacesuit resulted in requirement changes, which in turn
necessitated design changes to the EMU. The final section traced ten requirement
changes that resulted from the decision to use the Shuttle spacesuit aboard the ISS, and
discussed the twenty-four design changes that ensued. The next chapter is a comparative
analysis of the Russian Orlan and American EMU spacesuits and identifies the
underlying environmental causes behind differences in the two suits.

43
4 Comparative Analysis of the U.S. EMU and Russian
Orlan Spacesuits
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on how spacesuits fit into the broader category of EVA
systems and how the current American spacesuit has evolved to meet changing
requirements. However, spacesuit development is not unique to the U.S. The world’s first
EVA was performed by Alexi Leonov on March 18, 1965 in a spacesuit designed in the
U.S.S.R.5 When designing the next-generation spacesuit, it will be important to carefully
examine the past experience of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R./Russia in order to
understand what requirements changes are likely to occur in the future. Figure 6 shows
the cumulative EVA time (in person-hours) for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R./Russia
from the first EVA in the mid-sixties through April 2006. Whereas the U.S. EVA
program is characterized by times of intense activity punctuated by long periods of
inactivity, the Soviet/Russian EVA program from the mid-1980s reflects a more
continuous pace. This difference is reflected in the design of the spacesuits themselves.
Soviet/Russian spacesuit engineers favor evolving their systems over time, developing a
relatively large number of design iterations, while the U.S. tends to have a smaller
number of substantially different spacesuits.
This chapter explores the design differences of the U.S. and Soviet/Russian spacesuits
and identifies the underlying causes behind these differences and their implications for
the evolvability of the design. The divergence of the American and Soviet human
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Figure 6. US and Russian Cumulative EVA Time [as of 13 May 2006]
spaceflight programs in the late 1970s, with the Americans concentrating on the Shuttle
and the Soviets on station-based flight, is one key to understanding differences in
American and Soviet/Russian spacesuit design. The purpose of this chapter is to apply the
framework introduced in Chapter 3 to the U.S. and Soviet/Russian spacesuit designs.
However, rather than examining design differences across time (as was the case with the
EMU), this chapter examines design differences across space. The chapter first gives a
brief summary of Soviet/Russian spacesuit design, then explores the design differences of
the American EMU and Russian Orlan-M spacesuits in detail, and concludes with an
analysis of the differences in the U.S. and Soviet/Russian spacesuit environments.
4.1 Brief History of Soviet/Russian Spacesuit Design
Despite being designed in near-complete isolation from each other, early Soviet and
American spacesuit development is remarkable in its similarity. As in the U.S., early
Soviet spacesuits were derived from high-altitude pressure suits used by pilots. The first
cosmonauts wore an emergency-only rescue suit designed to operate for five hours in the
event of a cabin depressurization. Cosmonauts wore these 23 kg suits continually
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throughout the mission. The SK-1, used during Vostok missions 1 to 5, was designed,
tested, and operated in only six months.5 The SK-2 suit used on Vostok-6 was modified
to fit Valentina Tereshkova, who became the first woman in space in 1963. The spacesuit
garment was changed to have a smaller shoulder breadth, larger hip breadth, smaller
waist, and a smaller neck.5 Like the spacesuits worn during the Mercury missions, the SK
suits were made from completely soft materials and did not have any life support
capability other than what was provided by the vehicle.
Following the success of Vostok, the Soviet program planned an EVA to determine if
humans could perform useful work outside the spacecraft. The Berkut spacesuit, like the
SK-1, was a completely soft suit and was not removed during the mission (with the
exception of the helmet). “Berkut” means “golden eagle,” a name that began the
Soviet/Russian tradition of naming their spacesuits after birds. The Berkut was the first
Soviet spacesuit to incorporate a dual bladder design, such that if one pressure bladder
were punctured during operation, the second bladder would automatically inflate. This
feature has been included on each subsequent Soviet/Russian spacesuit design. The
Berkut had a basic open-loop life support system designed for 45 minutes of operation
and was connected to the vehicle via an umbilical that provided oxygen in case of an
emergency. The spacesuit garment was developed in only nine months and used by Alexi
Leonov on Voskhod-2 on March 18, 1965 to perform the world’s first EVA.5
With the knowledge that EVA was indeed possible, the Soyuz-4 and 5 missions
sought to demonstrate docking and EVA transfer of crew from one spacecraft to another.
To accomplish this task, engineers developed the first spacesuit dedicated solely to EVA,
the Yastreb (meaning “hawk”). The Yastreb spacesuit had a closed-loop life support
system in a pack worn strapped to the legs, which provided oxygen and carbon dioxide
removal for 2.5 hours and was used successfully in January 1969.5
Following these initial missions, the Soviets embarked on the L-3 Lunar Project, a
human mission to the Moon. During the mid to late sixties, engineers designed two
spacesuits to support a Moon mission. One suit (the Krechet, which means “golden
falcon”) was to be worn by the crewmembers on the lunar surface and the other suit (the
Orlan, meaning “bald eagle”) was for the crewmember orbiting the Moon. Although the
L-3 project was canceled in 1973 and neither suit ever flew, some features developed for
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them became standard in subsequent spacesuit designs. The Krechet was the first Soviet
suit to incorporate a HUT into the otherwise soft spacesuit garment. The life support
system was attached to the HUT via a large hatch through which the cosmonaut entered
and exited. The Krechet was also the first Soviet suit to use a liquid cooling garment
(LCG) that circulated water cooled by a sublimator around the crewmember for thermal
comfort.5 The Orlan was similar in design, but lacked a self-contained life support system
in order to save weight.40 These features, rear entry, HUT, sublimator cooling, and an
LCG became customary on all future Soviet/Russian suit designs.
Between the initial design of the lunar Orlan suit in 1977 and the present, there have
been five major Orlan revisions including the current Orlan-M, all of which have been
designed for long-duration spaceflight. The five major Orlan revisions represent a gradual
improvement in mobility and self-contained life support capability. With each revision,
the Orlan became less dependent upon an umbilical to provide it with capability,
eventually eliminating the need for an umbilical in 1990. Orlan revisions have also
included more mobility elements, such as joint bearings, and focused on fitting a larger
range of crewmember sizes.40 The most recent version of the Orlan-M spacesuit, used
aboard the ISS, focused primarily on enabling interoperability between the EMU and the
Orlan and included substantial changes to the Orlan’s on-board systems.148
The remainder of this chapter focuses on operational spacesuits, designs that were
flown aboard Soviet/Russian vehicles. However, as in the U.S., there have been a number
of experimental Soviet/Russian spacesuit design efforts aimed at creating future
spacesuits.149 One effort, the EVA Suit 2000, was a joint endeavor between Russia and
Germany and attempted to unite Russian experience with Western design principles. This
suit was to be used on the proposed Buran space shuttle, European Hermes vehicle, and
the ISS. The EVA Suit 2000 would have accommodated both male and female
crewmembers and was planned to be operated for 5-7 years without ground servicing.
This design effort is interesting because it provides insight into how the Russians might
design a new suit if they could start from scratch.67 The EVA Suit 2000 met a similar fate
as the proposed U.S. ISS-specific spacesuit; it was canceled due to funding constraints.
To gain insight into current Russian spacesuit design, it is helpful to draw some
parallels between Russian and American spacesuit design evolution. Figure 7 shows the
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chronological development of spacesuits in both programs and illustrates similarities in
the trajectory of each. As mentioned previously, both countries evolved their early
spacesuits from high-altitude pressure suits. Both nations also began their human
spaceflight programs with suits that would become active in emergency situations only,
termed intravehicular activity (IVA) rescue suits. Next, both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.
designed suits to serve the dual purpose of rescue and EVA, with the U.S.S.R.
subsequently designing its first EVA-only spacesuit, the Yastreb. Next, the U.S.S.R. and
America focused on landing on the Moon and designed planetary spacesuits that were
completely self-contained. It is here in history that the two programs diverged. After the
lunar effort, the Soviet space program focused instead on long-duration spaceflight based
on a series of space stations. America, meanwhile, briefly experimented with space
station Skylab, but went on to design a suit for multiple short-term Shuttle missions and
more recently began to modify the EMU for long-duration missions. Table 4 and Table 5
give a detailed account of each country’s operational spacesuits and track changes in
parameters such as suit pressure, mobility elements, and power usage. These tables
provide insight into why the EMU and Orlan-M spacesuits exist as they do today.
Figure 7. Soviet/Russian and American Spacesuit Design Comparison
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The divergence of the American and Soviet human spaceflight programs in the late
1970s, with the Americans concentrating on the Shuttle and the Soviets on station-based
flight, is one key to understanding the difficulties the U.S. has had operating the EMU
aboard the ISS (see section 4.2.1). Table 6 and Table 7 show total Soviet/Russian EVA
duration in person-hours by program and by spacesuit.1 With the exception of the
Voskhod and Soyuz programs, all Soviet/Russian EVA experience is station-based. The
Soviet/Russians have a total of nearly 1,000 person-hours of station EVA experience,
compared to about 230 hours for the U.S. Furthermore, Soviet/Russian engineers have
completed four major upgrades to their station-based Orlan suit while the U.S. modified
an existing Shuttle design. For all of the apparent similarities between the EMU and
Orlan-M spacesuits, fundamental design differences exist primarily because the two suits
were originally intended to operate in dissimilar operational regimes. Section 4.2 focuses
on the design differences between the EMU and Orlan-M and describes each in detail.
Table 6. Soviet/Russian EVA Duration by Program
Program Total EVA Duration
Voskhod     0:2451
Soyuz     1:145
Salyut 106:2051
Mir 709:5250,51
ISS 162:0650,162-170
Table 7. Soviet/Russian EVA Duration by Spacesuit
Spacesuit Total EVA Duration
Berkut     0:2451
Yastreb     1:145
Orlan-D   79:2051
Orlan-DM   63:3651
Orlan-DMA 494:3050,51
Orlan-M   340:5250,162-170
                                                
1 This table counts one, 4-hour EVA with two crewmembers as 8 person-hours.
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4.2 Design Differences between Orlan-M and EMU
This section gives a detailed description of the differences between the Orlan-M and
EMU and includes operational as well as hardware distinctions. The design differences
arise from distinct sets of requirements mandated by the two separate environments from
and for which the suits were designed. The Russian environment is characterized by long-
duration spaceflight, which leads to the use of a small number of cosmonauts, the need to
maintain suits on-orbit, and the training of cosmonauts to operate somewhat
autonomously. The American environment of short-term Shuttle missions, however,
enabled a relatively large number of astronauts to perform EVAs and mandated that each
minute of each Shuttle flight be used for productive work. This need for time efficiency
meant that the suits were to require no maintenance on-orbit and each EVA must be
meticulously planned and repeatedly rehearsed.
Although the two programs did face separate challenges, the basic requirement for a
spacesuit to enable useful work outside the main vehicle was the same. Thus, the two
suits also have similarities. First, both the Orlan-M and EMU are solely designed for
EVA and are not used as rescue suits. Second, both suits use a HUT with soft arms and
legs and include some mobility elements such as patterned joints and bearings. With
regard to the life support system, both suits now operate without an umbilical and
package the life support equipment in a backpack. Both suits use a liquid cooling garment
with water cooled by a sublimator.40 The EMU and Orlan-M use lithium hydroxide
canisters (LiOH) for carbon dioxide gas removal, although the EMU can also use metal
oxide (Metox).24,37,38,50 Finally, both suits have a sophisticated caution and warning
system that displays warning messages to the crew and keeps track of around 25 suit
parameters.19,43,149
4.2.1 On-Orbit Life
Beginning with the original lunar Orlan suit, Russian engineers have designed their
spacesuits to remain in orbit for its operational life of three to four years then to be
burned upon reentry. Six Orlan suits were aboard Mir for more than two years and two
suits were aboard for more than three years.44 The Orlan’s long on-orbit life is in sharp
contrast with the EMU’s original on-orbit life of one week. Russian designers have been
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able to achieve their goal of extended Orlan operation through a combination of hardware
design and operational measures, discussed in this section.
Russian reliance on crewmember servicing throughout the life of the spacesuit resulted
in a number of hardware changes from the original lunar Orlan suit to the operational
Orlan-D spacesuit. The primary and emergency oxygen tanks were redesigned to be
interchangeable and easily accessible as were many components that needed regular
servicing such as pumps and filters.40 On the other hand, the major components of the
EMU including the HUT, DCM, PLSS, and Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP) were not
originally designed to be changed on-orbit, but were redesigned in the 1990s out of
necessity.19 One inhibitor to this EMU redesign was the requirement that the EMU be
able to withstand 100 Shuttle launches, resulting in the use of significant packaging to
hold the EMU components in place during launch vibrations and accelerations.171 The
Russian suits, however, only needed to survive a single launch and could therefore make
use of straps, rather than screws, to hold components in place.172 This simplified suit
casing facilitated on-orbit modification.
One major inhibitor to the extended use of spacesuits in orbit is water. Water is used in
the cooling loop of both the Orlan-M and EMU, but is also an excellent solvent and
medium for life that tends to produce filter-clogging precipitate. Both programs use
biocides in the water and filters, but experience has led Russian engineers to design Orlan
suits to be able to operate even with significant water contamination.44 Orlan-DMA suit
N18 was aboard Mir for 3 years and 10 months before it was brought back to Earth on
STS-79 in September 1996. Because Orlan suits usually burn up on re-entry, evaluation
of this Orlan suit represented a unique opportunity to perform a complete systems check.
The only significant aberration from expected performance was a 22% increase in the
hydraulic resistance of the cooling water loop and an increase in impurities in the
hydraulic system water.44 The American program encountered a related problem in 2003
when two of three EMUs aboard the ISS were determined to be “no go” for EVA due to
water contamination.19 During this period, the suits were repaired by careful replacement
of pumps and filters, never intended to be handled on-orbit. Although the successful
repair of the EMUs on-orbit is certainly a testimony to the hard work and ingenuity of the
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crew, mission controllers, and engineers, replacement of similar components certainly
would have been easier on an Orlan spacesuit.
In order to avoid water problems as much as possible, the Orlan suits are protected by
both procedure and design. While the Orlan sublimator life is extended to three years
with the use of an expendable filter, the EMU sublimator has a limited 177-hour
operational life before needing replacement.19,44 The Russians have discovered that
thorough drying of Orlan suits after each EVA is key for long-term use. Mold has been
observed if the suit is not sufficiently dried.44 Because the Orlan ventilation is integrated
into the suit (rather than incorporated into the cooling garment as in the EMU), the
cosmonauts can activate the Orlan ventilation system while the suit is in storage through
a ventilation connector, which helps to prevent bacteria and mold growth.38
4.2.2 Redundancy
A second major difference between the EMU and Orlan spacesuits is their safety
requirements, which translates into different levels of redundancy in each suit. The EMU
was designed with a “fail safe” philosophy, meaning that the suit can withstand any
single failure and still get the crewmember back inside the vehicle or station safely.19 The
Orlan, on the other hand, was designed with a “fail operational” philosophy where the
suit can still function after any one failure and be used to complete the EVA.40 The fail
operational philosophy resulted in the Orlan being designed with a dual bladder, visor,
pump, and fan, whereas the EMU has only one of each of these elements.19,40,173 This is
not to say that the EMU is not safe; the EMU only uses redundant hardware where a
single failure would put the astronaut’s life in danger.38 This philosophy allows the EMU
to be a leaner design and avoid bulk through duplication. In general, a fail safe
philosophy leads to a heavier design because more components are critical to the ability
of the spacesuit to perform an EVA than are critical to the suit’s ability to support an
astronaut’s life. By paying the price in mass, however, a fail operational spacesuit is more
reliable because it is able to sustain a larger number of failures before an EVA must be
aborted.
4.2.3 Mobility
From the point of view of a crewmember, mobility is one of the most important
features of a spacesuit because it dictates how much work can be done. Joint torque and
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range of motion are the prime determinants of spacesuit mobility. A difference in
mobility between any two spacesuits arises from differences in the operating pressure of
the suits and use of mobility elements such as joint bearings. The rule is that a low
operating pressure and use of many bearings results in greater mobility. The Orlan
operates at 40 kPa (5.8 psi) while the EMU operates at 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi).40 The EMU has
more mobility bearings than the Orlan, although the number of bearings in Orlan suits
continues to rise in part due to American success with them.46 According to
crewmembers who have used both suits, the Orlan is stiffer and more fatiguing than the
EMU.173 A comparison of static torque and range of motion for the EMU and Orlan show
that the EMU is substantially more mobile than the Orlan, with the exception of the wrist
joint, which had comparable torque and range of motion values.38 Here, as in the
discussion of redundancy, reduced mobility should not imply that the Orlan is inferior to
the EMU. A higher operating pressure results in a reduced pre-breathe time, giving the
Russian suit added operational flexibility (discussed in section 4.2.8). This tradeoff
between mobility and pre-breathe time is further explored in Chapter 5.
4.2.4 Life Support System
The primary difference in the life support systems of the EMU and Orlan is in their
packaging. The EMU PLSS can be compared to a racecar, compact and efficient, whereas
the Orlan is more like an old Ford, a bit bulky but easy to work on. As explained in 4.2.2,
part of this difference comes from the Russian space program’s design for long-duration
flight and the subsequent need for their spacesuits to be maintained on-orbit. A second
origin of this difference is a requirement levied on the EMU by the Shuttle and inherited
by the ISS version of the EMU: when the EMU was originally designed, it had to be able
to pass through the inter-deck hatch in case of an emergency, a requirement that imposes
a front-to-back maximum dimension of 50 cm (19.75”). Conventional packaging methods
were simply too bulky and ease of maintenance was scarified for compactness.152 The
Orlan, on the other hand, was free of this requirement and has an overall diameter of 80
cm (31.5”).45 A second difference in the life support systems of the suits is the use of an
umbilical. Although neither suit now uses an umbilical, the Orlan umbilical was
eliminated relatively recently in 1990, while the last time an American spacesuit used an
umbilical was during the Skylab program in 1973-74.40
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4.2.5 Sizing
Although the stated design philosophy of both programs is to be able to fit the widest
range of crewmembers possible, the reality is that U.S. astronauts have a wider range of
body sizes (and genders) than do Russian cosmonauts.174 The Orlan-M garment is one-
size-fits-all with a choice of two glove sizes. To adjust the suit size more finely, the
cosmonaut tightens or loosens straps in the arm and leg. Orlan mobility is inhibited by the
resultant bunching of material in the limbs.173 In contrast, the EMU is required to fit a 5th
percentile woman to a 95th percentile man and more than 9,000 combinations of suit sizes
are possible, not including gloves which are often custom-made.19 The EMU garment is
essentially a modular design, with various sizes of arms, legs, and torsos available. To
don the EMU, a crewmember first puts on the pants, then slides into the upper torso, and
attaches the gloves and helmet. This donning process cannot be completed without the
help of another crewmember. Although the Orlan cannot accommodate the same range of
sizes as can the EMU, its garment is essentially integrated: the helmet, upper torso, and
lower torso are permanently attached. To don the Orlan, a crewmember slides through a
hatch at the back and is able to put on the spacesuit unassisted. The origin of this self-
donning philosophy can be traced to the original Orlan suit, which was designed for use
by the lone crewmember orbiting the Moon when the other two cosmonauts were on the
lunar surface. The suit therefore had to be self-donning.38
4.2.6 Operations
As with differences in on-orbit life, redundancy, and life support system design, the
differences in EVA operations between the U.S. and Russia stem primarily from Russia’s
considerable experience with long-duration spaceflight. Space Shuttle missions can be
characterized as a ballet, where every move is choreographed and rehearsed in advance
whereas long-duration spaceflight is more akin to a hiking expedition, training is needed,
but the participants have more autonomy to determine the best course of action. As an
example of how these divergent philosophies result in operational differences, although
both programs use similar methods of training such as in neutral buoyancy pools or
parabolic flight, Americans receive an average of 5-6 day-long pool training sessions per
EVA compared to 2-3 days for Russians.38,175 The Russian training is more general and
aimed at providing a foundation of basic skills, whereas the U.S. training is more task-
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specific.51 Russians tend to let the need for an EVA arise naturally rather than schedule
them in advance. On average, about 40% of Russian EVAs are unscheduled and needed
for repair tasks.41 Concentrating on skill-based training is one key to increasing the
autonomy of the crewmembers, but will also likely require on-orbit refresher training for
specific tasks.176 Research into how to provide this just-in-time refresher training is
ongoing.177
A second operational difference between the U.S. and Russia lies in the execution of
the EVA itself. Americans almost always use foot restraints during EVA in order to
establish a stable worksite whereas Russians tend to free float and use fewer handholds,
footholds, and tether points (Figure 8, images courtesy of NASA).51 Russians
intentionally design their hardware not to need large forces or precise movements,
eliminating the need for foot restraints.175 The two programs also differ in their use of
tools. In order to save space inside the pressurized station, Americans stow their tools in a
box outside the ISS. During an EVA, they exit the airlock, traverse to the tool chest,
retrieve the tools, attach them to their suits, then traverse to the worksite. Russians prefer
to store their tools inside the station and load them into a toolbox before depressurizing
because this method is more time efficient and does not involve attaching as many tools
to the suit.175 Lastly, the operational differences between American and Russian EVA
were documented by astronaut Jerry Linenger, the first American to perform an EVA
from a foreign space station in a foreign spacesuit. Linenger noted that the EVA timeline
is of reduced importance for the Russians, and he observed no interaction between the
crewmember left inside Mir and the EVA crew, in contrast to American EVA in which an
intravehicular crewmember usually stays in contact with the spacewalkers.51
4.2.7 Radiation
Radiation is one of the most serious threats to human health in long duration
spaceflight and protection has continually been identified as one of the key technologies
that must be developed to enable sustained human presence on the Moon and exploration
to Mars. As one example of the seriousness of radiation protection, a solar storm occurred
on August 4, 1972, between Apollo 16 and 17. Had this storm occurred during one of the
landings, it would have caused acute radiation sickness and possibly death.178 Radiation
is of particular concern during EVA because the crewmembers are outside the protective
shielding of the spacecraft. Normally crewmembers wear a single dosimeter throughout a
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Figure 8. EVA Using Foot Restraints (Left) and Free-Floating (Right)
mission, yielding only a single data point for the entire mission. Furthermore, this
dosimeter is worn underneath the HUT during an EVA, which is one of the most heavily
shielded parts of the spacesuit and does not reflect radiation dosage in the head or limbs.
Only one set of data exists that quantifies radiation dosage a single. During a spacewalk
on April 29, 1997, crewmembers wore special dosimeters on the outside of their
spacesuits that measured absorbed dose rates between 60 and 80 µGy per hour, 3 to 4
times higher than doses measured inside the station.179 Despite this increased risk,
radiation protection is usually accomplished by planning EVAs during periods of low
solar activity.
There are three basic types of radiation encountered by astronauts in LEO. The more
predictable of these are the trapped particles in the Earth’s radiation belts (known as the
Van Allen belts). Because of the difference in location between the Earth’s geographic
axis and its magnetic axis, these radiation belts come closest to the Earth over the south
Atlantic, a spot known as the South Atlantis Anomaly (SAA). Figure 9 is a projection of
the SAA for STS-61, the first Hubble servicing mission, and shows regions of high-
energy trapped protons (from Ref. 180). On Mir, cosmonauts got half of their total
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Figure 9. World Map Showing the South Atlantic Anomaly
radiation dose from the 2 to 5 percent of the time they spent passing through the SAA.
The second type of radiation is solar radiation, caused by particles generated by the Sun
during Solar Particle Events. This form of radiation is less predictable, but generally
follows the 11-year Sun cycle. The Earth’s geomagnetic field protects from this kind of
radiation in low inclination orbits (orbits near the equator), but does not shield from solar
radiation above about 50 degrees latitude. The final form of radiation is Galactic Cosmic
Radiation (GCR), which is a source of penetrating radiation, mostly found in high
altitude orbits. Because of the energies of GCR particles, neither spacesuits nor space
stations block this type of radiation effectively.179 Neither the EMU nor the Orlan-M
spacesuits have any special design features to help shield for radiation; rather, radiation
avoidance is accomplished by scheduling EVAs such that they do not occur during a
solar storm or when the station is passing through the SAA.
When Russia was added as a partner to the ISS, its planned orbit was changed to
accommodate launch from Russian sites. This new high-inclination orbit (51.6°)
increased the exposure of crewmembers to solar radiation. Even considering the worst
case, however, possible radiation exposure aboard the ISS is not life threatening. The
primary medical concern is increased risk of cancer.178 In order to address this risk,
scientists performed a laboratory experiment to determine how the Orlan-M and EMU
spacesuits block radiation. A sophisticated measuring device was placed inside each
spacesuit, which was then exposed to various types of radiation. The study concluded that
each suit had advantages and disadvantages. For example, the Orlan helmet provided
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better eye protection while the EMU helmet provided superior brain protection. Overall
each suit provided about the same level of radiation protection and the study concluded
that there was no clear reason to prefer one suit over another.179
4.2.8 Medical Operations
The final difference in the American and Russian EVA programs is medical
operations. Differences in medical operations arise from variation in the type and number
of medical parameters measured during an EVA as well as a difference in the way each
program manages the risk of decompression sickness. In general, Russians track more
biometric parameters than do the Americans. During an EVA, Russian mission control
monitors ECG, breathing frequency, heart rate, body temperature, and metabolic rate.49
During the Gemini program, U.S. astronauts measured blood pressure, ECG, body
temperature, and respiration rate, but the EMU currently tracks only ECG and metabolic
rate. 79,160 As one indication of the physical stress caused by an EVA, increased protein
and several erythrocytes can be found in the urine 1-2 days after a hard spacewalk,
indicative of intense physical exertion.49
Comparison of biometric data across EVAs and between spacesuits can yield insights
into the physical exertion required to do an EVA. Some evidence exists that suggests that
experience can drastically lower the physical exertion required to perform an EVA. In
one study of similar EVA tasks, heart rates in experienced EVA cosmonauts were 14-40
beats per minute lower than in novice crew.49 One final interesting comparison can be
made between American and Russian metabolic cost. Although metabolic cost is
influenced by experience, the tasks required during an EVA, and the operating
environment, it is also strongly influenced by suit mobility. As implied in section 4.2.3,
EMU mobility appears to be greater than in the Orlan suits. This assertion is corroborated
by metabolic data. The mean metabolic rate for Orlan-suited crewmembers on Mir was
3.7 kcal/min, while the mean rate during the STS-114 EVAs in the EMU at the ISS was
3.2 kcal/min.49 Although this is an imperfect comparison, it does seem to indicate that the
EMU requires less metabolic expenditure than Orlan.
A second major difference between the U.S. and Russian programs is in the risk
management of decompression sickness. Because both spacesuits operate in a low-
pressure environment, crewmembers are at risk of decompression sickness caused by the
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gasification of nitrogen dissolved in their blood. Breathing pure oxygen before an EVA in
order to purge the nitrogen from the blood mitigates this risk. Because the Orlan-M
operates at a higher pressure than the EMU, the pre-breathe time for the Orlan is only 35
minutes, compared to 4 hours for the EMU.173 This reduced pre-breathe time translates
into a decreased footprint for a Russian EVA. On Mir, the total time required for an EVA
– including pre- and post-EVA procedures – averaged 13 hours and this figure is even
higher for U.S. EVA.49 Risk of decompression sickness is measured by a metric called
the R-value, a ratio of the tissue nitrogen partial pressure to the total pressure. Russia
distinguishes between R-values for different tissues because each tissue releases nitrogen
on a different timescale, with connective and fatty tissues releasing nitrogen the
slowest.48 An R-value of 1 represents no risk of decompression sickness and values above
1.4 are considered potentially dangerous.180 For Russian EVAs from the beginning of the
program through 1991, R-values ranged from 1-2.1 (µ = 1.83).181 The U.S. defines a
single R-value with a timescale on the same order as the connective and fatty tissues. For
15 EVAs from STS-6 to STS-37, R-values ranged from 1.3-1.8 (µ= 1.6).47 Although
differences in the calculation of the R-values account for some of the difference in pre-
breathe time between the programs, the American program is more conservative with
regard to decompression sickness. It is important to note, however, that neither program
has ever documented decompression sickness in any of its active crew.
4.3 Analysis of change in Orlan and EMU design
The driving forces behind the variations between Orlan and EMU design are
differences in the political, economic, physical, and technical environments of the two
suits. These environment differences translated into two distinct sets of requirements,
which led to many differences in design and operation. That the Russian system was able
to more easily adapt to use aboard the ISS is understood in light of the fact that the
environment adjustment was smaller for Russia than the U.S. Changing a spacesuit’s
requirement from operation aboard Mir to operation aboard the ISS does not result in as
many design revisions as does changing the requirement from Shuttle to ISS operations.
Indeed, almost all of the design differences identified in this chapter can be attributed to
optimization of the Soviet/Russian spacesuits for station-based flight and optimization of
the EMU for the Shuttle.
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The U.S.S.R./Russia has focused on station-based spaceflight from the 1960s. Sergey
Korolev, the Chief Designer of the Experimental Design Bureau that held primary
responsibility for human space programs, believed that the early part of space
development would involve the operation of spacesuits from space staions.5 As discussed
extensively in Chapter 3, the American space program did not focus on long-duration
flight until the 1990s and chose to modify the existing EMU rather than build a new suit
exclusively for the ISS. The space station mindset of the Soviet/Russian program
imposed specific spacesuit requirements including: (1) a 3-4 year operational life without
ground servicing, (2) on-orbit sizing, and (3) increased autonomy of crewmembers. These
three requirements account for the design differences discussed in sections 4.2.1, On-
Orbit Life; 4.2.2, Redundancy; 4.2.4, Life Support System; 4.2.5, Sizing; and 4.2.6,
Operations. Each design or operational difference discussed in these sections is a result of
optimization of the Orlan for station-based flight. However, not all design differences
between the EMU and Orlan-M are attributable to station versus Shuttle use.
To this point, environment has been defined as political, economic, technical, or
physical; the aggregate of these aspects can be termed the cultural environment.
Differences in the cultural environment also account for design differences. For any
complex design with multiple objectives, many solutions are possible that balance
tradeoffs between the objectives differently. The final decision between competing
designs often depends upon the relative importance a decision maker places on each
objective. For example, the Soviet/Russian program chose to value a minimal pre-breathe
time over increased mobility and designed interfacing hardware such that it could be
operated with minimal tactility. As described in section 4.2.3, this decision led to design
differences with the EMU because the U.S. program valued mobility over pre-breathe
time. A second example of cultural differences resulting in requirement and design
differences is the choice of different R-values to measure the risk of decompression
sickness (4.2.8). The use of dissimilar R-values resulted from a difference in the
application of the R-value metric and a difference in the willingness to accept risk.
Understanding the environmental differences from where the design differences arise will
help in the design of the next-generation spacesuit.
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The future of human spaceflight is planetary exploration. Because the mission
timescale of planetary exploration is on the order of months, the future regime of
spaceflight more closely simulates current station-based flight. In other words, the EVA
requirements for planetary exploration will be similar to those of long-duration, station-
based flight. Because this is the environment the Soviet/Russian program has been
operating in for almost thirty years, future EVA systems should incorporate many of the
design and procedural strategies used by the Russians. Those strategies that resulted from
Russia’s focus on station-based spaceflight should be emulated because these changes
will help the performance of the next-generation American spacesuit. The distinctions
resulting from cultural differences should be discussed, but not necessarily followed,
because each nation’s strategy offers very effective performance, with different tradeoffs.
In conclusion, the different political, economic, technical, and physical environments
of the Orlan and EMU led to stark differences in requirements, which translated into
design differences. This section described those differences, both operational and
hardware, and sought to understand the underlying causes of the distinctions. This
chapter concludes Part I. Chapter 5 looks ahead toward the design of the next-generation
spacesuit and describes the development of a multidisciplinary spacesuit model.
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5 Development of a Multidisciplinary Spacesuit Model
This chapter describes the development of a multidisciplinary spacesuit model.
Several spacesuit models currently exist in the literature for spacesuit thermal,80,182,183
mobility,35 and power subsystems; however, none of these models incorporates all of
these disciplines simultaneously. Although a partial understanding of the operation and
performance of a spacesuit at the subsystem level can be attained using existing models,
the spacesuit is a highly-interdependent, human-sized spacecraft, and an integrated model
is needed to aid in the understanding, design, and operation of the spacesuit as a complex
engineering system. This chapter begins with an overall description of the model,
describing the choice of the design vector, objective functions, and model parameters.
Next, the interactions between the subsystems and objective functions are discussed.
Finally, the details of the four subsystems – thermal, structures, oxygen, and power – are
explained. Chapter 6 uses the spacesuit model to conduct multi-objective optimization.
This model was initially developed as a class project and I gratefully acknowledge the
help of my project partner, Cristin Smith.
5.1 Objective Functions
This section discusses the organization of the model a high level and elaborates on the
choice of objective functions. The inputs and outputs of each subsystem are listed in
Figure 10. One basic assumption of this model is that the spacesuit will be a gas pressure
suit using a liquid cooling garment and life support backpack. The purpose of the model
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Figure 10. Model Inputs and Outputs
is to gain insight into multidisciplinary interaction in the next-generation spacesuit, the
design of which will likely occur within the next ten years. The architecture of the
spacesuit was therefore assumed to be an evolution of existing operational spacesuits and
excluded promising, but low readiness level technologies such as mechanical counter-
pressure. This assumption has the effect of freezing basic design features of current
spacesuits and allows us to explore designs within our present operational knowledge.
The first step in the model development was the selection of the spacesuit objective
functions and the subsystems that were necessary to evaluate these objectives. Mass,
volume, pre-breathe time (PBT), and mobility were selected as the four initial objective
functions. Spacesuit mass is of prime concern for two reasons: first, launch costs dictate
that the spacesuit be as light as possible; second, the crewmember must carry the
spacesuit, and high mass limits mobility and spacewalk duration. Spacesuit volume
directly affects the design of other vehicle subsystems, such as the airlock, due to
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stowage and don/doff requirements. For mobility reasons, spacesuits often operate at
reduced pressures requiring astronauts to pre-breathe pure oxygen for a given amount of
time prior to the EVA in order to reduce the risk of decompression sickness. The PBT is
currently a major operational constraint to the speed and frequency of EVAs. The final
objective function is mobility. The quantity and quality of work an astronaut can do
inside a spacesuit is strongly influenced by the amount of work exerted to move and the
range of motion of the spacesuit joints.
The four objectives represent the primary measures of utility for a spacesuit design.
The ideal spacesuit has low mass, stowage volume, and pre-breathe time, and high
mobility. Even though each of these objectives is highly desirable, they compete with
each other and the spacesuit designer must trade between them. For example, a spacesuit
with high mobility can either be manufactured with hard components that have
isovolumetric joints, or it can be a soft suit that necessitates a lower operating pressure.
Use of hard components, while enhancing mobility, will drive up suit mass and stowage
volume, and a low pressure suit will have a high pre-breathe time.
5.2 Model Subsystems and Parameters
The four subsystems, oxygen flow, thermal, structures, and power, predominantly
determine the objective functions. The subsystems include oxygen flow, thermal,
structures, and power. The oxygen subsystem models the flow of oxygen from the
primary oxygen tanks located in the suit backpack, into the spacesuit garment, and back
into the life support system where it is scrubbed for carbon dioxide. The thermal
subsystem models water flowing from the cooling garment worn by the crewmember and
into the backpack where it is cooled and returned to the cooling garment. The third
subsystem, structures, models the spacesuit garment as hard, soft, or a combination of the
two. As an example, the EMU has a hard, fiberglass upper torso and soft arms and legs.
The final subsystem, power, is a technology switch that includes known data on a variety
of power storage methods. Other possible modules could include data, communications,
radiation, and tool interface. However, the four modules chosen are the primary drivers
for the hardware design of the spacesuit and chiefly establish its representative
parameters such as mass and volume.
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The next phase of the modeling process was the selection of a design vector, the
elements of which represent the key aspects of a spacesuit design. These elements are
operating suit pressure, suit garment hardness, power technology, and carbon dioxide
removal technology. Because of pre-breathe constraints, it is assumed that the spacesuit
operates at 100% pure oxygen. The operating pressure is a continuous variable bounded
between 25 kPa (the human physiological limit) and 101 kPa (pressure at sea level).184
The suit garment hardness variable is a discrete scalar value and determines the hardness
of the arms, legs, and upper torso. The carbon dioxide removal and power variables are
both technology switches and select among given technology options. Although there are
dozens of possible design variables, the four chosen have the most influence on the
objective functions and consequently are among the first decisions made when designing
a spacesuit.
Because the ultimate goal of the model is to explore possible spacesuit designs across
a variety of environmental and operational conditions, model parameters allow the
simulation of diverse conditions. The model includes eight operating environments,
corresponding to the Moon (hot, average, and cold), Mars (hot, warm, average, and cold),
and microgravity that determine the values of the ambient temperature, ambient pressure,
gravity, and suit heat leak (Table 8). The heat leak parameter is the amount of power
escaping from the suit and is related to wind conditions, solar flux, and ambient
temperature. The model also includes three EVA profiles to specify how the
crewmember’s metabolic rate changes during the EVA (Table 9). For example, during a
moderate EVA, the crewmember generates 150W for one quarter of the total EVA
duration, 260W for 45 percent of the EVA, 300W for 27 percent of the EVA, and has a
peak power generation of 400W for three percent of the EVA. These metabolic profiles
are based upon known metabolic rate ranges as well as metabolic rate data from the three
STS-114 EVAs. Finally, a parameter that specified the duration of the EVA was
included. Current durations are approximately seven hours, but future EVAs could be
substantially shorter or longer. The model parameters enable the simulation of a variety
of EVA and mission profiles.
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Table 8. Environment Parameters
Environment Tamb [°C] Pamb [Pa] PSuitLeak [W]
Mars Warm -23 850 5
Mars Cold -123 850 168
Mars Average -58 850 47.5
Mars Hot 20 850 -50
Moon Hot 150 0 -90
Moon Cold -170 0 100
Moon Average 0 0 10
Microgravity 0 0 10
Data from Refs. 38,158,182
Table 9. Metabolic Rate Parameter
Easy EVA Moderate EVA Hard EVA
Rest (150 W) 50% 25% 5%
Light Work (260 W) 45% 45% 25%
Moderate (300 W) 5% 27% 40%
Hard Work (400 W) 0% 3% 30%
Max Exertion (590 W) 0% 0% 10%
Data from Ref. 37, page 1-1 and STS-114 EVA Data
5.3 Model Interactions
With an understanding of the basic construction of the model, this section looks at the
interaction between the model subsystems and objective functions. As indicated in Table
10, the mass of the suit is determined primarily by the structures subsystem, with small
contributions from each of the other subsystems. In reality, the mass of the spacesuit has
significant contributions from both the life support backpack and the spacesuit garment;
however, because the materials and support structure of the backpack was assumed to be
common to all designs, the weight of the life support backpack is largely fixed. The small
variations in backpack weight are due to changing amounts of cooling water, oxygen, and
battery power needed for each mission. Similar to spacesuit mass, the suit volume is also
dominated by the structures subsystem in our model. This is again due to the fact that
large changes in volume occur when switching between an all-hard and all-soft suit that
overwhelm the smaller changes caused by selecting a different carbon dioxide removal
device, reducing the size of the suit water tanks, or using a different battery. The
remaining objectives, PBT and mobility, are determined by the structures subsystem and
represent a significant tradeoff that must be made when designing a spacesuit. In a
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Table 10. Subsystem/Objective Function Interaction
S/O Mass Volume PBT Mobility
Oxygen + + - -
Thermal + - - -
Structures ++ ++ ++ ++
Power + + - -
++ strong correlation
+ slight correlation
- no correlation
predominantly soft suit, such as the EMU, PBT and mobility are competing objectives.
As spacesuit pressure increases, PBT decreases and mobility likewise decreases.
5.4 Spacesuit Model Development
This section presents the development and validation of each model subsystem. Each
of the four subsystems is described in detail, including assumptions, and validation
against known values of operational spacesuits.
5.4.1 Oxygen Flow Model
The oxygen flow subsystem models the flow of oxygen from its inlet into the suit,
around the crewmember where it is contaminated with carbon dioxide, and returned to
the life support system where the contaminants are removed. This subsystem model helps
to determine the mass and stowage volume of the spacesuit. The model’s user is offered a
choice of technologies for carbon dioxide removal, lithium hydroxide or metal oxide.
Given the spacewalk duration and suit pressure, this module also calculates the volume of
the life support backpack. The model assumes that the suit helmet is similar in design to
other spacesuits37,38 and that the requirements for maximum inspired amount of CO2 are
the same as the current requirements for the EMU.36 The model also assumes that the suit
atmosphere is pure oxygen and assume values for oxygen use36, suit oxygen leak36, and
tank storage pressure are similar to EMU values.37
The oxygen flow model was validated against three parameters: amount of oxygen
needed, volume of primary oxygen tanks, and size of life support backpack. The model
predicts that the crewmember will need 0.59 kg of oxygen for an eight-hour EVA, about
seven percent less than the amount of oxygen the EMU carries.37 The EMU has two
primary oxygen bottles, with a total volume of 0.0079 m3.37 The model predicts a volume
of .0073 m3, 7.5% less than the actual volume. The length of the backpack is determined
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primarily by the length of the primary oxygen bottles and the secondary oxygen bottles
plus a fixed amount of space for the battery. The width and height are determined by
rules of thumb. The dimensions of the PLSS are highly correlated to the actual values of
the EMU (Table 11).
Table 11. Backpack Measurement Verification
EMU
[m]
Model [m]  % Error
Height 0.762 0.7000 8.1
Depth 0.129 0.1201 7.4
Width 0.350 0.3505 0.1
The EMU backpack measurements are from Ref. 37
5.4.2 Thermal Model
The thermal module combines physics-based modeling and known, empirical
relationships to model heat transfer throughout the suit. This subsystem model helps to
determine the mass of the spacesuit by calculating the weight of the life support backpack
and amount of water consumed during the EVA. The primary purpose of a spacesuit
thermal system is to reject waste heat from the crewmember and electronics and keep the
crewmember at a comfortable temperature. The thermal model assumes that the
crewmember is wearing a liquid cooling garment, consisting of a bodysuit with
interwoven tubing, as is currently used on the EMU and Russian Orlan spacesuits. Waste
body heat is collected via water running though the tubes. The model uses an empirical
relationship between the metabolic rate of the crewmember and water temperature to
determine the proper water temperature at the inlet of the garment (Twater,Out).
36 The
model also assumes a mass flow rate (
€ 
˙ m In) and models the flow of water as it exits the
spacesuit, goes through each of two heat rejection devices and flows back into the liquid
cooling garment (Figure 11). The remainder of this section describes the relationships
between the variables in the thermal subsystem.
First, the total amount of heat added to the suit is calculated (qtot):
€ 
qtot = PCM + PBattery − PSuitLeak         (1)
where PCM is the power added to the suit by the crewmember, which changes during the
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Figure 11. Thermal Subsystem Schematic
EVA, Pbattery is the waste heat given off by the battery and other electronics, and PSuitLeak
is the heat leaking from the suit. The model then calculates the temperature of the water
into the thermal subsystem (TWater,In):
€ 
TWater,In =
qtot
˙ m InCpWater
+ TWater,Out     (2)
where 
€ 
˙ m In  is the mass flow rate of the water, CpWater is the specific heat of water, and
TWater,Out is the temperature of the water going out of the thermal subsystem (and into the
cooling garment). Next, the model determines the maximum heat that the radiator could
possibly reject (qrad,Max):
€ 
qrad ,Max = SAradσε
Twater,In + Twater,Out
2 + 273.15
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
− Tamb + 273.15( )4 (3)
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where SArad is the surface area of the radiator, determined by the dimensions of the life
support backpack, σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, ε is the radiator emissivity, and
Tamb is the ambient temperature.
The model assumes that the radiator is the preferred method of rejecting heat because
the radiator does not consume water and is not dependent upon a pre-determined
environmental pressure to function. The model then compares the heat that the radiator
needs to reject (qtot) to the maximum amount that the radiator could possibly reject
(qrad,Max) and determines whether or not the radiator alone can handle the heat rejection. If
the radiator can handle it (qtot < qrad,Max), then the thermal control valve for the sublimator
(TCV2) is turned off and the model iterates to find how much water should go through
the radiator in order to reject qtot. The iteration process varies the setting of TCV1 from
fully closed to fully open and at each step calculates the amount of water going through
the radiator (
€ 
˙ m rad ), the amount of water bypassing the radiator (
€ 
˙ m rad ,bypass), and the
temperature at the outlet of the radiator (Trad,out). The setting for TCV1 is determined
when the temperature at the outlet of the radiator (Trad,out) equals the desired temperature
at the outlet of the thermal subsystem (TWater,Out).
In the case where the radiator cannot handle the heat load (qtot > qrad,Max), then all of
the water first goes through the radiator and the model iterates to see how much
additional water must go through the sublimator in order to reject a total of qtot. The
model then iterates the settings of TCV2 from fully closed to fully open and finds the
flow rate of the water going through the sublimator (
€ 
˙ m sub ), the rate of the water bypassing
the sublimator (
€ 
˙ m sub,bypass) and the temperature at the outlet of the sublimator (Tsub,out). As
with TCV1, the setting for TCV2 is determined when the temperature at the outlet of the
sublimator (Tsub,out) equals the desired temperature at the outlet of the thermal subsystem
(TWater,Out). If the sublimator is activated, model then uses the duration of the EVA stage
to calculate how much water the sublimator consumed during the current phase (rest,
light work, etc.). This process is then repeated for each of the five values of metabolic
rate and a total amount of water consumed is added to the system mass.
The thermal model assumes that the system is in steady state, that all components are
adiabatic except the radiator and sublimator, and that the specific heat of water is
constant over the temperature range. The thermal subsystem also assumes that the
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radiator is a grey body radiating to a black body enclosure and that the temperature of the
water in the radiator is the average of the radiator inlet and outlet temperatures.
In order to validate the model, published results from a similar spacesuit thermal
model were used.36 The thermal subsystem model outputs were compared to the
Campbell, et al. model outputs for the Mars nominal environmental case (Table 12 and
Table 13). The Campbell model calculates the temperature of the water into the thermal
unit (Twater,In) whereas the model presented in this chapter uses an empirical relationship
based upon the crewmember metabolic rate to find this value. Because of the slight
difference in assumptions between the two models, the total amount of heat that the
thermal model must reject is slightly different. The large difference in TCV2 settings can
be explained by the fact that the heat rejected by the sublimator is not very sensitive to
the TCV setting. Conversely, the TCV setting is very sensitive to the amount of heat that
is rejected. Other than this one discrepancy, the values for the model match well with the
published, validated Campbell data. The amount of water consumed by the sublimator
was also validated. For a strenuous, 8-hour EVA in micro-gravity, the model predicts the
crewmember will consume 3.4 kg of water, very close to the EMU’s value of 3.6 kg.37
Table 12. Thermal Model Validation, PCM = 275 W
 Campbell8 Model % Error
qrad 157 164 4
qsub 84 64 24
TCV1 0.97 1 3
TCV2 0.07 0.03 57
Twater,In 23.6 24.15 2
Table 13. Thermal Model Validation, PCM = 400 W
 Campbell8 Model % Error
qrad 141 147 4
qsub 230 206 10
TCV1 1 1 0
TCV2 0.35 0.12 66
Twater,In 18.39 18.9 3
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5.4.3 Structural Model
Of the four spacesuit model subsystems, the structures subsystem most influences
each model objective. This subsystem is primarily responsible for determining the mass
and stowage volume of the spacesuit and solely determines the suit’s operating pressure
and PBT. The structures subsystem models the spacesuit garment and uses published data
with physics-based modeling to determine the mass, volume, mobility, and pre-breathe
time for the spacesuit garment. As explained in 3.3.5, the amount of work a crewmember
must do to move any joint increases with the pressure inside the suit. In a hard suit, the
joints are isovolumetric, so the crewmember does not have to do any work to compress
the gas inside the suit. Consequently, joint torques are not a function of pressure in a hard
suit and their magnitudes are reduced. In order to model PBT as a function of pressure,
the model assumes that the vehicle pressure will be 101 kPa and uses an empirical
relationship.180
Of approximately twenty spacesuit joints, the model focuses on the mobility of the
seven outlined in Table 14. These seven joints provide mobility for most movements and
cover the three major sections of the suit, the arms, legs, and torso. Based upon the
division of the spacesuit into these three segments, five possible spacesuit hardness
fractions are defined, detailed in Table 15. Even though it might seem reasonable to
model percent hardness as a continuous variable, this does not make physical sense. No
spacesuit design would have just one hard arm or leg, for example. Discretizing the
hardness fraction in this manner allows the model to capture the designs of all existing or
past spacesuit designs (about ten in all).
Table 14. Suit Mobility Body Section Breakdown
Arms Elbow flexion/extension
Shoulder
flexion/extension
Shoulder
abduction/adduction
Legs Hip flexion/extension
Hip abduction/adduction
Knee flexion/extension
Torso Torso rotation
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Table 15. Suit Hardness Description
%
Hardness
Description
0 completely soft suit, I-Suit concept
0.3 hard upper torso (HUT), soft limbs
0.5 hard arms, HUT, soft legs
0.8 soft arms, HUT, hard legs
1 completely hard suit, AX-5 concept
Because the values for range of motion and joint torque depend upon detailed factors
such as friction between fabric layers, patterning of the soft joints, and the specific design
and materials used in the bearings, the model uses empirical data for joint torque and
range of motion. The I-Suit concept, A7LB, EMU, and D-Suit concept all had soft arms
and legs and had published data on range of motion and torque.185,186 The AX-5 concept
was a completely hard suit and also had published range of motion and torque data.187
Finally, hard upper torso data was available for the EMU only. Ranges of motion and
torque values were averaged for joints that had multiple data points. The stowage volume
and mass data also came from these sources.
As mentioned, torque is a function of pressure for soft spacesuit joints. In order to
model the relationship between joint torque and pressure, the subsystem implements a
physical model of soft spacesuit joints, using the membrane model developed by Fay and
Steele188 and validated by Schmidt, et al.35 The membrane model models the joint as a
cylindrical tube and treats the spacesuit fabric wall as an inextensible layer that wrinkles
when bent. Using this physical model, a relationship between the joint torque and suit
pressure was derived. Even though joint torque is a function of flexion angle, the model
assumes a single value for the torque of each joint.
In order to define the mobility metric, the structures subsystem uses normalized range
of motion and torque values for each joint as well as weighting factors determined by the
environment. For all environments, mobility in the upper body and torso is important to
be able to accomplish most tasks. In microgravity, stiff spacesuit legs are beneficial
because the astronaut is often locked into a foot restraint and can use the stiff lower torso
to counteract the forces imposed on the suit by the EVA activities. Conversely, on the
Moon and Mars lower body mobility is important for locomotion and tasks where the
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crewmember must bend their legs (accessing the planetary surface, sitting in a rover,
e.g.). First, the range of motion values for the arms, legs, and torso were linearly
normalized between 0 and 1, with 0 representing the lowest range of motion and 1
representing the highest. Next, the torque values were normalized, but this time 0
represented the highest torque and 1 represented the lowest. Assuming that range of
motion and torque are equally weighted and each individual joint is equally important,
the mobility objective is as follows:
€ 
mobility = warms(ROMarms + Torquearms) + wlegs(ROMlegs + Torquelegs) + wtorso(ROMtorso + Torquetorso) (4)
Each of the range of motion and torque variables can take on a maximum value of 1,
which represents the best possible range of motion and lowest torque. For example, in the
Moon or Mars environment, mobility is desired in the entire suit so warms, wlegs, and wtorso
are all equal to 1. In this case, a mobility metric of 6 represents the best possible suit
mobility. In the microgravity environment, wlegs= 0 because leg stiffness is desirable so a
mobility metric of 4 represents the most mobile suit. By this metric, the mobility of the
EMU in microgravity is 2.9 whereas the mobility of an all-hard suit scores a perfect 4.
Because the mobility metric output was based on empirical data, with the exception of
the relationship between joint torque and pressure, validation was unnecessary. The
empirical model used to determine the PBT is slightly different than that used by the
EMU community and predicts a PBT of 4.67 hours for a spacesuit at the same pressure of
the EMU, a 14% error from the actual EMU pre-breathe time of 4 hours.
5.4.4 Power Module
The power module outputs the mass, volume, and thermal output of the power
subsystem for a space suit. The module is also capable of modeling reserve power for
contingency purposes. The module is capable of modeling all of the energy storage
options in Table 16.189-191
In order to determine the necessary capacity of the spacesuit batteries, one must
consider the power requirement, the time during which power is required, the depth of
discharge of the battery (DOD), as well as a transmission efficiency (n). The following
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Table 16. Power Options for Spacesuit
Energy Storage Energy
Density [W-
hr/kg]
Volumetric
Density [W-hr/L]
Batteries (NiCd) 35 80
Batteries (NiH2) 60 60
Regenerative Fuel Cells ~1000 ~35
Batteries (NiMH) 60 100
Batteries (Lithium-Ion) 170 400
Batteries (AgZn) 130 240
Li-Solid Polymer
Electrolyte
200 375
Li-Solid Polymer
Inorganic Electrolyte
200 300
equation outlines this calculation:192
€ 
C = (Pdemand * tEVA )DOD* n       (5)
where C is the battery capacity, Pdemand is the power needed from the other suit
subsystems, and tEVA is the EVA duration. To determine the mass and volume of the
battery, the following two equations are used:
€ 
mbatt =
C
energy _ density
     (6)
€ 
Vbatt =
C
volumetric _ density      (7)
where mbatt is the mass of the battery and Vbatt is the volume of the battery. In addition to
determining the mass of the batteries themselves, one must also take into consideration
the power management and distribution hardware which is approximated using the
following rule of thumb:192
€ 
mPMAD = 0.02*Pdemand + 0.025*Pdemand  (8)
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The power subsystem assumes that the power for the spacesuit will be provided by
batteries (i.e. energy storage) rather than primary power generation methods such as solar
arrays or fuel cells. The model also assumes that the transmission efficiency between the
battery and the load is 0.9 and that the power management and distribution mass includes
all of the necessary wires and electronics to distribute the power. In order to validate the
power module, known data for the EMU 2000 Series AgZn Batteries was used. The
average power used by the EMU primary battery was inputted (63.8 W) and an EVA
duration of 8 hours and the model predicted the mass and volume of the battery within
five percent.
5.5 Utility and Limitations of the Spacesuit Model
This thesis views the spacesuit as an integrated multidisciplinary system that should be
designed using optimization approaches similar to those used for primary space systems
such as the habitat or vehicle. In order to accomplish this task, the EVA community
should begin by building an integrated, multidisciplinary model of the spacesuit. The
model presented in this chapter has many limitations and is not intended to be the
ultimate spacesuit model, but represents a starting point for future development.
One limitation of this model is the overwhelming effect the spacesuit hardness
variable has on the mass and stowage volume objectives. A more advanced model could
demonstrate the effect choices like backpack packaging and oxygen tank pressure have
on the suit and could generate more accurate values for mass and stowage volume.
However, none of these design variables have competing objectives and subsequent
optimization would merely select the lightest materials, most compact geometry, and
highest possible tank pressure. The current model does capture the tradeoff between a
hard, mobile garment with high mass and volume and a soft, light, and compact garment
with low mobility. It is this area of uncertainty that subsequent optimization routines
explore.
In this chapter, a multidisciplinary spacesuit model was developed and validated
against the EMU. The next chapter will use this model to conduct a series of multi-
objective optimization studies across a variety of environments in order to help determine
how to best design the next-generation spacesuit.
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6 Multi-Objective Spacesuit Design Optimization
The previous chapter described the development of a multidisciplinary spacesuit
model that evaluated spacesuits on the basis of mass, stowage volume, pre-breathe time,
and mobility. This chapter uses that model to explore spacesuit architectures. First, a
sensitivity analysis is performed to gauge the effect of the design vector and parameters
on the objective functions. Second, a single point optimization is performed in the Mars
normal environment using an N-Branch Tournament Genetic algorithm. Finally, this
optimization is performed in a variety of environments and differences in the optimal
design vector are discussed.
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is an important precursor to optimization because it helps to
capture the effect of the model assumptions and inputs to the objective functions. The
effect of the design vector was measured for an 8-hour, moderate EVA in the normal
Mars conditions. The initial design vector had a suit pressure of 56.4 kPa, hard legs and
upper torso (corresponding to a hardness of 0.8), power technology of AgZn, and CO2
removal technology of LiOH.
The sensitivity analysis shows that a 10% decrease in spacesuit pressure causes the
PBT to increase from less than five minutes to almost an hour and the mobility to
improve by 2%. The sharp increase in PBT reflects the extra time needed for the body’s
tissues to release nitrogen. The sensitivity of the objective functions to the remaining
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discrete design variables was determined in comparison to the next most similar option.
For example, increasing suit hardness from hard legs and upper torso (hardness of 0.8) to
hard arms, legs, and upper torso (hardness of 1), increases volume by 20% and mass by
16%. Changing the power option only has an effect on volume and mass of about 5%.
Finally, changing the CO2 removal technology increases mass by 8%. Overall, the
sensitivity analysis indicated that the objective functions are substantially affected by the
choice of suit pressure and suit hardness and less affected by CO2 removal technology
and battery technology choice. The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Table
17.
Table 17. Sensitivity Analysis
Pressure
(kPa)
Power Hardness CO2
Removal
Mobility Volume
(m3)
Mass
(kg)
PBT
(hr)
56.489  AgZn    0.8 LiOH   4.55   0.71   150  0.02
50.84  AgZn    0.8 LiOH   4.62   0.71   150  1.01
56.489  RFC    0.8 LiOH   4.55   0.72   143  0.02
56.489  AgZn    1.0 LiOH   6.0   0.85   172  0.02
56.489  AgZn    0.8 Metox   4.55   0.71   162  0.02
A second analysis was performed to gauge the sensitivity of the objective functions to
the parameters of EVA duration, planet, temperature, and crew workload. Cutting the
EVA duration in half only causes an decrease in volume and mass on the order of 1%.
This is due to the fact that the major determinants of mass such as suit hardness and
backpack structure are fixed and overwhelm the slight increase in water and oxygen mass
needed for a longer EVA. Increasing the ambient temperature or metabolic rate increases
the mass less than 1% because the astronaut must carry more cooling water. Finally,
changing the planet from Mars to the Moon has little effect on the mobility metric.
However, a change from Moon or Mars to micro-gravity changes the mobility metric
substantially because lower-body mobility is desirable on planetary surfaces but not in
microgravity where a stiff lower body is advantageous in establishing a stable work
platform. In summary, the design variables have a greater effect on the objective
functions than the parameters. The spacesuit hardness design variable has an
overwhelming effect on mass and volume.
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6.2 Single Point Optimization
This section describes the optimization methods used on the model and gives results
for an optimization performed for an 8-hour, moderate EVA on an average Mars day.
First, the model set-up for optimization is given, and then the genetic algorithm method is
described. Finally, the results are discussed.
6.2.1 Model Configuration for Optimization
As described in sections 5.3 and 5.4.3, the spacesuit hardness design variable has an
overwhelming effect on mass and volume. Although mass and volume are normally
competing objectives (a smaller volume usually indicates a high density and therefore
high mass), because the spacesuit garment is a hollow, hard shell, mass and volume are
directly related. Initial four-objective optimization using the N-Branch Tournament
Genetic Algorithm (described in section 6.2.2), revealed this trend. Figure 12 is a two-
dimensional slice of the four-dimensional Pareto front showing the relationship between
mass and stowage volume. Each design falls near the y = x line indicating that the mass
and stowage volume objectives are not competing with each other.
Figure 12. Pareto Front for Mass and Stowage Volume
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Because the mass and stowage volume objectives are not competing with each other, the
stowage volume objective is eliminated from the objective function:
€ 
J(x) =
mass kg[ ]
−mobility 0 − 6[ ]
PBT hr[ ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(9)
where x is the design variable vector
€ 
x =
psuit
PowerTechnology
CO2RemovalTechnology
HardnessFraction
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10)
Therefore, the problem formulation becomes:
min J(x, p)
such that 25 kPa ≤ x1 ≤ 101 kPa
x2 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (11)
x3 = 1, 2
x4 = 0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1
where p are the model parameters
€ 
p =
Environment [1- 8]
EVAduration  [hr]
MR [1- 3]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(12)
Here, the environment parameter includes information on the planet and temperature
conditions and the metabolic rate (MR) profile as described in section 5.2, Table 8 and
Table 9. This problem formulation was used for all of the optimization and analysis
presented in the rest of this chapter.
6.2.2 Genetic Algorithm Overview
The genetic algorithm (GA) is a heuristic search technique that mimics Darwin’s
theory of Natural Selection and the principal of Survival of the Fittest.193 It begins with
an initial population of randomly generated design vectors for an engineering system,
evaluates them on the basis of the objective and constraint function values, and selects
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the designs that perform the best to mate and populate the next generation.194 The GA
incorporates parent selection, crossover or mating, and mutation operators to match the
behavior of biological populations in their evolutionary processes (Table 18). The GA
approach is most applicable to spacesuit optimization because of its ability to handle
discrete and continuous design variables and nonlinear design space.193 Discrete design
variables such as power and CO2 removal technology switches prohibit the use of
gradient-based techniques.
Table 18. Genetic Operators
Genetic Operator Type
Selection N-Branch Tournament
Crossover Uniform
Mutation Small rate ( < 1%)
Multi-objective optimization differs from single objective optimization in that there
are numerous designs that satisfy the objectives equally well. With a single objective, the
design that best fulfills this objective is the most favorable. However, with multiple
objectives, it is possible to have a family of designs that fulfill the objectives in different
ways and represent tradeoffs between the objectives. To take a simple example, imagine
that you wanted to purchase a new car and your objectives were to maximize
performance and minimize cost. You could choose to buy a new car with great
performance at a high price or an old car with okay performance at a much lower price.
Neither of these cars is clearly favored and which one you choose depends on how you
value cost versus performance. In the nomenclature of optimization, these two cars are
non-dominated. A solution to an optimization problem is non-dominated if no other
solutions exist that rate better on all objectives simultaneously. In our car example, the
new car has a higher cost than the old car, but it also has a better performance so the new
car is not dominated by the old. The set of all non-dominated solutions to an optimization
problem is called the Pareto set. At the completion of a genetic algorithm search, the
designer has a family of non-dominated solutions, which allows the decision maker to
choose the ultimate design based on how they value the objectives relative to each other.
The N-branch tournament selection approach was adopted to solve this three-objective
spacesuit optimization problem because it does not evaluate the designs based upon a
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single meta-objective that is a combination of each individual objective.195 Rather, N-
branch tournament selection establishes a competition during which a number of
members of the population compete based on a fitness value associated with each
objective. The optimization algorithm is described in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Genetic Algorithm Process Including N-Branch Tournament Selection
In the first step, an initial generation of designs are created by randomly choosing
values for each design vector variable within the specified bounds. Next, three of these
initial designs are selected and compete based upon mass. The design with the lowest
mass is placed into the parent pool and this process is repeated until all the original
designs have competed. At the end of this round, one third of the designs will be in the
parent pool. Then, all the initial designs are restored and compete three-at-a-time based
on mobility. This process is repeated once more for PBT. At the end of this process, the
parent pool is the same size as the initial population; however, the parent pool now
contains up to three copies of each initial design vector. The final two steps are crossover
and mutation. In crossover, designs from the parent pool are selected two-at-a-time and
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their design vectors swapped to produce the next generation. Each child then has the
possibility of having its design vector randomly mutated. The mutation step helps to keep
the algorithm from getting trapped in local optima. The selection, crossover, and
mutation steps are then repeated for a pre-determined number of generations. The
resulting solutions are then passed through a Pareto filter to eliminate the dominated
solutions and determine the Pareto set.
6.3 Results for Single Point Optimization
For the first optimization, the model parameters were set to a moderate, 8-hour EVA
in an average Mars climate. After running the GA for 400 generations and passing the
solutions through a Pareto filter, the algorithm converged on 123 spacesuit deigns, any of
which could be considered the ”best” design depending on the relative importance of the
objectives. Because there are three objectives, the family of non-dominated solutions
creates a surface in three-dimensional space. The three-dimensional plot of the Pareto
front as well as three, two-dimensional plots are shown in Figure 14. The utopia point
represents the best possible design (high mobility, low mass, and low PBT). Five designs
are highlighted in each plot and the corresponding objective function evaluations and
design vectors are shown in Table 19.
This set of non-dominated designs helps the spacesuit engineer to better understand
the tradeoffs in designing a spacesuit. There is no one design that is a clear winner and
each design involves sacrificing to some extent one or more of the objectives. For
example, the plots show general trends such as the direct relationship between mass and
mobility and between pre-breathe time and mobility. This is because increasing the
mobility generally involves adding bearings to the suit joints (increasing mass) or
decreasing the suit pressure (increasing PBT). One of the most striking characteristics of
the plots in Figure 14 is the striations in the data. The two-dimensional plots of PBT and
mass and PBT and mobility show three long lines of points as well as an outlying point
on the x-axis (point 1). These groups of points correspond to the different possible values
of the spacesuit hardness variable. This design variable strongly influences mass and
volume, creating the distinct sections in the Pareto front.
The points in Table 19 were selected to show designs across the spectrum of the Pareto
front. Point 1 is an all-hard suit operated at a high pressure. Because of its
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Figure 14. Spacesuit Optimization Pareto Frontiers for Mars Average
Table 19. Points on Pareto Front for Mars Average
Point Mobility
(0-6)
Mass
(kg)
PBT
(hr)
Pressure
(kPa)
Power
Technology
CO2
Tech.
Hardness
1 6 167 0 101 Fuel Cell LiOH all hard
2 5 107 5.6 25 Fuel Cell LiOH hard arms,
HUT, soft
legs
3 4.9 130 3.6 35.9 NiMH Battery Metox hard arms,
HUT, soft
legs
4 3.8 86 4.7 29.8 Li-Solid Polymer
Inorganic
Electrolyte
LiOH HUT, soft
arms and
legs
5 1.7 47 0 57.7 Fuel Cell LiOH all soft
89
configuration, it scores a perfect 6 on mobility and has no PBT, but has the highest
possible mass. Point 2, a low-pressure suit with hard arms and a HUT, is excellent on
mobility and mass, but sacrifices PBT. Suit 3 is similar to Suit 2, but has a slightly higher
operating pressure, which increases its PBT. Suit 5 is an all soft suit, operated at a
relatively high pressure. This suit sacrifices mobility for PBT and mass. All of these suits
(points 1, 2, 3, and 5) score well on two objectives, but poorly on the third. Suit 4, a low-
pressure suit with a HUT, strikes a compromise between the three objectives, scoring
medium on mass, mobility, and PBT. Most of the suit designs use LiOH for CO2 removal
and fuel cells for their power. This is because LiOH offers a weight savings over Metox
and the fuel cell technology is the most energy dense of all the technologies. It is
interesting to note, however, that not all designs along the Pareto front have these
options. This is due to the mutation aspect of the GA and emphasizes the point that the
GA cannot guarantee that it will find the global optima. It is not immediately clear which
of the suits in the Pareto frontier is the “best.” Indeed, the final selection will depend
upon how the decision maker chooses to trade the objectives.
It is interesting to note that no spacesuit designs with a hardness of 0.8 (HUT, hard
legs, soft arms) are in the Pareto front for the Mars environment. This is due to the fact
that for Mars, mobility for the arms and legs are weighted equally. Therefore, a spacesuit
with poor arm mobility, but good leg mobility is equivalent to a spacesuit with good arm
mobility and poor leg mobility. At any given pressure, the mobility metric of a suit with
hard arms and soft legs (hardness fraction of 0.5) is the same as the mobility metric of a
suit with soft arms and hard legs (hardness fraction of 0.8). However, the suit with hard
arms and soft legs (0.5) weighs less than the suit with soft arms and soft legs (0.8) and the
two suits have the same mobility and pre-breathe time so the lighter suit always
dominates the heavier suit, eliminating it from the Pareto front. This result would not be
the same if upper and lower body mobility were valued differently.
This initial investigation suggests that the power and CO2 removal technologies have
little impact on the spacesuit architecture, whereas suit hardness and suit pressure have a
far greater impact. Often suit pressure and hardness are determined at the beginning of
the design effort and these early choices greatly influence the overall characteristics of
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the spacesuit. These results should be useful in the design of the next generation of
spacesuits.
6.4 Multi-Environment Optimization
Until this point in the analysis, only spacesuits designed to operate in the Mars
environment have been considered. However, spacesuits are used in multiple
environments and for multiple purposes including microgravity missions (both short and
long-term), planetary exploration, EVA, and launch and entry. As described in chapters 3
and 4, system requirements emanating from different environments are distinct and lead
to the design of substantially different spacesuits. The purpose of this section is to
explore different spacesuit environments, analyze how a spacesuit’s optimal design might
change for each environment, and determine if certain suit designs might be better suited
to operate in multiple environments.
In order to investigate how a spacesuit design might change in a different
environment, an optimization analysis similar to that described in section 6.2.2 was
performed, but in the microgravity environment. The algorithm converged on 113
designs in the Pareto front and the results of this analysis are presented in Figure 15 and
Table 20. One of the major differences between the two Pareto fronts is the mobility
metric. In a planetary environment, the mobility metric ranges from 0 to 6 (the arms,
torso, and legs can each contribute up to 2 points to the overall metric, see section 5.4.3.)
For the microgravity environment, however, the metric only ranges from 0 to 4 because
leg mobility is not considered desirable in microgravity. A second difference is in the
number of striations seen in the data. The two-dimensional plots show only two majors
striations, corresponding to hardness fractions of 0.3 (HUT, soft arms and legs) and 0.5
(HUT, hard arms, soft legs). In fact, no suits with hardness fractions of 0.8 (HUT, soft
arms, hard legs) or 1.0 (all hard) are in the Pareto front. The reasons for this choice will
be explained next.
The points in Table 20 (and identified in Figure 15) were selected to highlight the
similarities and differences in the Pareto fronts for Mars and microgravity. The CO2
removal technology and power technology variables did not change between the two
environments. This is a realistic result as the choice of those technologies depends upon
the EVA duration, mission duration, required number of cycles, and desire to reduce
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Figure 15. Spacesuit Optimization Pareto Frontiers for Microgravity
Table 20. Points on Pareto Front for Microgravity
Point Mobility
(0-4)
Mass
(kg)
PBT
(hr)
Pressure
(kPa)
Power
Technology
CO2
Tech.
Hardness
1 4 108 0 101 Fuel Cell LiOH HUT, hard
arms, soft legs
2 2.9 84 4.9 28.6 Fuel Cell LiOH HUT, soft
arms and legs
3 1.1 49 0 57.7 Fuel Cell LiOH all soft
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mass, none of which varies with location. The interesting changes in the design vector
occurred in the hardness variable and spacesuit pressure. As mentioned, no suits with a
hardness of 0.8 or 1.0 were in the Pareto front. Both of these types of suits have hard legs,
which increases mass by adding mobility in the legs. Since lower body mobility is not
optimized in microgravity, designs with hard legs are dominated by designs with soft legs
because the soft leg designs have lower mass, equivalent PBT, and equivalent mobility.
Also, no suits with a hardness fraction of 0.5 (HUT, hard arms, soft legs) and a pressure
lower than 58 kPa are in the Pareto front. For suits with hard arms and soft legs, designs
with low pressure have a higher PBT than suits with higher pressure. Because the suits
have hard arms and a HUT, mobility is not a function of pressure; therefore, suits with a
hardness fraction of 0.5 and low pressure are dominated by suits with a hardness fraction
of 0.5 and a higher pressure.
Point 1 in Table 20 has approximately the same objective function evaluations as
point 1 in Table 19, but has a different design vector. For both environments, point 1
represents a suit that sacrifices mass for mobility and PBT. In the Mars environment,
perfect mobility can only be found in an all-hard suit and low PBT corresponds to a high
pressure. For microgravity, perfect mobility can be found in a suit with hard arms and a
HUT, of which the lightest is a 0.5 suit (HUT, hard arms, soft legs). Point 2 in Table 20
has a similar design vector and objective function evaluations as Point 4 in Table 19. This
point is a design vector similar to that of the EMU. It is quite interesting that the EMU
lies on the Pareto front for both the Mars and microgravity environments. In both
environments, the EMU has a moderate mass, mobility, and relatively high PBT. Point 3
in Table 20 also has a similar design vector and objective function evaluations as point 5
in Table 19. This point represents a spacesuit that sacrifices mobility for mass and PBT.
For both environments, this corresponds to an all-soft spacesuit with a low pressure.
Table 21 compares the mobility, mass, PBT, pressure, and hardness fractions of the two
points discussed that are included in both Pareto fronts.
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Table 21. Comparison of Pareto Points for Mars and Microgravity
Point % Mobility
Marsa
% Mobility
µgb
Mass
Mars (kg)
Mass
µg (kg)
PBT
(hr)
Pressure
(kPa)
Hardness
4/2 63 73 86 84 4.7 29.8 HUT, soft
arms and legs
5/3 28 28 47 49 0 57.7 all soft
a defined by dividing the mobility metric of this design by the maximum possible mobility for
Mars (e.g. 3.8/6 = 0.63)
b defined by dividing the mobility metric of this design by the maximum possible mobility for
microgravity (e.g. 1.1/4 = 0.28)
From this analysis, one can conclude that the optimal spacesuit garment design might
or might not be different for different environments, depending upon how the decision
maker weighs the objective functions relative to each other. For example, we have seen
that optimizing mobility and PBT while allowing mass to be unconstrained, leads to
different garment designs in the microgravity and planetary environments. However,
valuing mass and PBT over mobility or valuing all three objectives the same can lead to
similar garment designs.

95
7 Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Work
7.1 Summary and Contributions
The ability for crewmembers to perform spacewalks is an essential component of
human spaceflight. The current goals of the U.S. space program call for a return to the
Moon and eventual human exploration of Mars. In this next era of planetary exploration,
spacesuits will play an important role, enabling astronauts to interact with their
surroundings and helping them to accomplish the scientific and engineering goals of the
mission. The main purpose of this thesis is to aid the designers of the next-generation
spacesuit through rigorous analysis of existing spacesuits and quantitative optimization of
future spacesuit architectures.
 Because spacesuits change substantially over their design lifetimes, the next-
generation spacesuit must be designed with the ability to cope with the likelihood of
changing requirements after it has been fielded. This goal, as I have shown in this thesis,
can be accomplished in two steps: first, the system designer must have an understanding
of what requirement changes are likely to occur; second, quantitative analysis can be used
to determine how requirement changes affect the design and subsequently what designs
can more readily accommodate change. My thesis was divided into two parts to address
these two steps. Part I was qualitative in nature and presented a snapshot of spacesuits in
time as well as their evolution in time. Part I consisted of Chapter 2, An Integrated
Systems Approach to Spacesuit Design, Chapter 3, Understanding Change and
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Requirements Evolution in the Design of the EMU, and Chapter 4, Comparative Analysis
of the U.S. EMU and Russian Orlan Spacesuits.
The objective of Chapter 2 was to understand the spacesuit in the context of EVA and
study what the technical community has written about spacesuit design. The traditional
approach to EVA has customarily focused on, and sought to optimize, individual pieces
of hardware in isolation of the rest of the system. By having a component focus, the
traditional approach has often introduced inefficiencies into the system, generated
logistics and supply management problems, and created hardware legacies that are hard
to change and upgrade. In its stead, Chapter 2 presented an integrated systems approach
for EVA system design that can aid the development of an exploration-class EVA system
by optimizing the system as a whole and designing for uncertainty. Because designers
have limited a priori knowledge of what explorers might encounter on the surface of the
Moon or Mars, it is necessary to design a system capable of adapting to changes in
requirements based upon what we discover and how the environmental uncertainty
unfolds. Flexibility can be added to the system via hardware design (e.g., modularity),
software implementation, crewmember training, and procedure development. Although it
is not possible to anticipate each uncertainty, a flexible system will meet changing
requirements and be capable of incorporating advances in technology with minimal
performance and resource (e.g., mass, volume, and cost) penalties.
Chapter 3 looked at the evolution of the American EMU spacesuit over time. The
chapter began by challenging the common presumption that requirements change should
be avoided and proposed a new attitude toward change. Rather than artificially freezing
requirements, system designers should acknowledge that change is inevitable in the
design of any long lifetime system and design their systems to be able to adapt to this
change. Chapter 3 then examined the history of the EMU, described its major
components and functions, and discussed the baseline environment in which the spacesuit
was initially designed to operate. Fundamentally, the EMU was conceived as a limited-
capability spacesuit to be used in emergency situations. However, immediately after it
was fielded, NASA began to make changes to the EMU for a variety of reasons. The final
section in Chapter 3 explored the implications of the decision to modify the Shuttle EMU
for use aboard the ISS, and the resulting requirements and design changes. Chapter 3
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concluded by observing that, given the number of requirement and design changes that
occurred in the EMU, the next generation spacesuit, which will likely be fielded for a
decade or two, will have to be designed with the ability to cope with the inevitability of
changing requirements after it has been fielded.
Chapter 4, the final chapter in Part I, discussed the design of the Russian Orlan
spacesuits and compares their current design and evolution to the design of the EMU.
The driving forces behind the variations between Orlan and EMU design are differences
in the political, economic, physical, and technical environments of the two suits. These
environment differences translated into two distinct sets of requirements, which led to
many differences in design and operation. Because the Soviet/Russian program has
historically centered upon long-duration, station-based spaceflight, the Orlan was
designed to be maintainable on orbit, at the cost of volume and crew time. On the other
hand, the American Shuttle program of short, highly intensive missions mandated that the
suits require as little on-orbit maintenance and stowage volume as possible, leading to the
design of a highly compact and complex spacesuit. Indeed, almost all of the design
differences identified in this chapter can be attributed to optimization of the
Soviet/Russian spacesuits for station-based flight and optimization of the EMU for the
Shuttle. Since the mission timescale of future planetary exploration is on the order of
months, the future regime of spaceflight more closely simulates current station-based
flight. Because this is the environment the Soviet/Russian program has been operating in
for almost thirty years, future EVA systems should incorporate many of the design and
procedural strategies used by the Russians. Those strategies that resulted from Russia’s
focus on station-based spaceflight should be emulated because these changes will help
the performance of the next-generation American spacesuit.
Whereas Part I represents the qualitative core of the thesis, the analytic substance is
found in Part II. Chapter 5, Development of a Multidisciplinary Spacesuit Model, and
Chapter 6, Multi-Objective Spacesuit Design Optimization, bring to bear design
optimization techniques used for complex, multidisciplinary systems.
Chapter 5 described the development of a multidisciplinary spacesuit model. Several
models currently exist in the literature to describe individual spacesuit subsystems;
however, none of these models incorporates all of these disciplines simultaneously.
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Although a partial understanding of the operation and performance of a spacesuit at the
subsystem level can be attained using existing, single-discipline models, the spacesuit is a
highly-interdependent, human-sized spacecraft, and an integrated model is needed to aid
in the understanding, design, and operation of the spacesuit as a complex engineering
system. This chapter began with an overall description of the model, describing the
choice of the design vector, objective functions, and model parameters. The spacesuit
design vector consists of a continuous spacesuit pressure variable, and discrete variables
that determine the power technology, carbon dioxide removal technology, and spacesuit
hardness. The objective functions of the model are suit mass, stowage volume, PBT, and
mobility. The model user can set an environment parameter that determines the location
(Moon, Mars, or microgravity) and ambient environmental conditions. The user can also
set the duration of the EVA and specify a metabolic profile for the spacewalk. Chapter 5
described the interactions between the subsystems and objective functions and noted that
the hardness of the spacesuit garment primarily determined the spacesuit mass and
volume and solely determined the suit PBT and mobility. The chapter described the
development and validation of each model subsystem in detail and discussed the
limitations of the model.
Chapter 6 used the spacesuit model to explore optimal spacesuit architectures with
respect to the objective functions of mass, mobility, and pre-breathe time. First, a
sensitivity analysis was performed and determined that the PBT is very sensitive to the
spacesuit pressure, mobility is sensitive to both the suit pressure and hardness, and the
mass is sensitive to garment hardness. Secondly, a single point optimization was
performed in the Mars normal environment using an N-Branch Tournament Genetic
algorithm. There is no one design that was a clear winner and each design involved
sacrificing to some extent one or more of the objectives. Most optimal designs have a fuel
cell and LiOH carbon dioxide removal technology. The designs ranged from an all-hard
suit with great mobility and PBT, but poor mass to an all-soft suit with low mass, but
poor mobility and PBT. Finally, this optimization was performed in the microgravity
environment and differences in the optimal design vector were discussed. This second
optimization run chose similar power and carbon dioxide removal technologies, but
different spacesuit garment designs. The garments on the microgravity Pareto front were
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softer because lower body mobility was not desired. It is quite interesting that the EMU
was on the Pareto front for both the Mars and microgravity environments. In both
environments, the EMU has a moderate mass, mobility, and relatively high PBT. From
this analysis, one can conclude that the optimal spacesuit garment design might or might
not be different for different environments, depending upon how the decision maker
weighs the objective functions relative to each other. Chapter 6 showed that optimizing
mobility and PBT while allowing mass to be unconstrained, leads to different garment
designs in the microgravity and planetary environments, while valuing mass and PBT
over mobility or valuing all three objectives the same can lead to similar garment designs.
This work builds on the existing spacesuit literature by reflecting upon the spacesuit as
one part of a complex, system-of-systems and advocates that the design of the next-
generation spacesuit be in full cooperation with the other systems that enable EVA.
Additionally, the thesis provided detailed case studies of the change histories of both the
American EMU and the Russian Orlan spacesuit. A firm understanding of how each
system came to be along with the knowledge of how and why each system changed is
essential to designing future spacesuits capable of adapting to change. The final
contribution of this thesis is the use of multidisciplinary optimization techniques in
spacesuit design. Because the model used for this optimization is multidisciplinary,
fundamental tensions in spacesuit design are captured that have not before been explored
with existing single-discipline models. Taken as a whole, this thesis offers a
comprehensive evaluation of spacesuit design and evolution, from both a qualitative and
analytic perspective.
7.2 Recommendations for Future Work
Future work on this topic could expand in two dimensions: (1) deepening the analysis
into best practices for the design of the next-generation spacesuit, and (2) extending this
work to other complex engineering systems. This section discusses each of these two
dimensions and raises questions that could be addressed in future work.
7.2.1 Further Spacesuit Analysis
One clear suggestion for future work would be to add fidelity to the spacesuit model to
increase the accuracy of the current subsystems, include more variables in the design
100
vector, and incorporate more objective functions. The existing subsystems assume that
the basic design of the next-generation spacesuit will be similar to that of existing
operational spacesuits. However, removing this assumption would allow alternative
concepts such as mechanical counter pressure, foam packaging for the life support
backpack, and variable stiffness spacesuit limbs to be explored. Adding subsystems could
involve the development of a communications module to model the spacesuit radio and
telemetry hardware. As an example of an additional objective function, the mass
objective could be divided into two parts, single-EVA spacesuit mass and multiple EVA
spacesuit mass, both of which would be minimized. The model currently outputs single-
EVA mass and so selects lighter technologies (such as LiOH) even though they might
only last for a single EVA and be inefficient in the long-term.
A second interesting study would be to interview the spacesuit stakeholders and try to
evaluate their preferences for the various objective functions. With multi-objective
optimization, it is possible to have a family of designs that fulfill the objectives in
different ways and represent tradeoffs between the objectives. Interviewing stakeholders
such as crewmembers, mission control personnel, spacesuit engineers, and policymakers
could help to eliminate portions of the design space and allow designers to focus on a few
promising design vectors. These designs could then be developed in detail to further
refine the model’s initial estimations of mass, PBT, and mobility.
7.2.2 Extension to Other Systems 
Another interesting area for future work would be the extension of the framework
presented in this paper to other complex engineering systems. The inefficiencies created
by optimizing a single piece of hardware (rather than the entire system) occur repeatedly
in design problems. Although this thesis focused on the contribution of the spacesuit to
the EVA system, the EVA system is itself one part of an even larger system called Life
Support and Habitability. Applying the integrated systems approach to the Life Support
and Habitability system could further ease logistics problems and produce mass savings.
Because the spacesuit and the vehicle or planetary habitat provide similar functions, one
could imagine many commonalities in hardware. Collective design of like components
would benefit the system as a whole.
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9 Appendix A – Image Gallery
Astronaut John Glenn with Flight Surgeon Dr. William Douglas and equipment specialist Joe
Schmitt prior to the Mercury-Atlas 6 mission. Glenn is wearing his pressure suit, a modified
version of the U.S. Navy Mark IV high-altitude suit and carrying a portable ventilation unit.
(Image courtesy of NASA S62-00330.

115
Soviet SK-1 pressure suit worn by Yuri Gagarin during training. Note that this suit, like the
Mercury suit, is completely soft. Both suits are worn depressurized during the duration of the
mission and only activated in the case of an emergency. (Image courtesy of the Smithsonian
Institution 97-15263.)

117
Berkut spacesuit worn by Alexi Leonov in preparation for the world’s first EVA on March 18,
1965. The umbilical supplies emergency oxygen, supports communications, and transmits
medical and technical data. The suit also has a backpack that supplies primary oxygen. Also
pictured is the inflatable airlock used during training for the Voskhod 2 mission. This airlock
allowed the vehicle to remain pressurized. (Image courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution 97-
16249-12.)

119
Ed White during the first U.S. EVA on June 3, 1965 wearing his G4C EVA spacesuit. The gold
umbilical carries power, oxygen, communications, and medical data and attaches White to the
spacecraft. White is carrying a cold gas, hand-held maneuvering unit. Like the Mercury suit, this
spacesuit is completely soft and has a close-fitting helmet. White has an emergency oxygen pack
strapped to his chest. Because the Gemini spacecraft lacked an air lock, the entire cabin was
depressurized, exposing both White and James McDivitt to vacuum. (Image courtesy of NASA
S65-30427.)

121
Soviet Yastreb spacesuit used on the January 1969 Soyuz 4/5 mission in which two cosmonauts
transferred from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz 4 using this type of spacesuit. This spacesuit used an umbilical
for power, communications, and to transfer medical and technical data. The life support system
was worn strapped to the legs so that the crewmembers could fit through the capsule hatch. The
life support system included an evaporating heat exchanger that cooled the oxygen circulating
around the cosmonauts. (Image courtesy of Andy Salmon.)

123
Astronaut Buzz Aldrin wearing the A7L spacesuit during Apollo 11. The spacesuit garment is
completely soft with the exception of upper arm and wrist bearings. The life support system is
worn strapped to the back and includes an oxygen and emergency oxygen supply, CO2 removal
capability, battery, sublimator, and radio. Underneath the spacesuit, the astronaut is wearing a
liquid cooling garment, which circulates cool water around the crewmember. (Image courtesy of
NASA AS11-40-5903.)

125
Astronaut Jack Lousma during a Skylab EVA on August 6, 1973. This spacesuit is a version of
the Apollo A7L-B suit, modified to use an umbilical rather than a Portable Life Support System
(PLSS). (Image courtesy of NASA SL3-117-2099.)

127
Two images of the Russian Orlan-M spacesuit aboard the ISS. This spacesuit has soft arms and
legs, but a hard upper torso. The helmet lights pictured in these images were developed by NASA
and adapted for use on the Orlan. (Images courtesy of NASA, top: ISS010-E-21175, bottom:
ISS011-E-11958.)

129
Astronaut Don Pettit during a training exercise wearing an EMU. The spacesuit is connected to
the airlock with an umbilical, but would be disconnected prior to an EVA. Pettit is wearing a
paper checklist on his left arm. (Image courtesy of NASA, JSC2002E36205.)
